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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Security of Interconnected Stochastic Dynamical Systems
by
Rajasekhar Anguluri
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Mechanical Engineering
University of California, Riverside, December 2019
Dr. Fabio Pasqualetti, Chairperson
Modern dynamical systems are large and inevitably comprise different subsystems
that are often integrated with cyber (computation and communication) components. The
applications of these systems are far reaching, ranging from power and water networks, to
telecommunication and transportation systems etc. Recently, researchers and hackers have
shown that these systems are vulnerable to attacks targeting their physical infrastructure
or the signals exchanged between the physical and cyber layers. Given the interconnected
nature of dynamical systems, and the fact that each subsystem usually has only partial
knowledge or measurements of other interconnected units, the security question arises as
to whether sophisticated attackers can hide their action to the individual subsystems while
inducing system-wide critical perturbations.
This thesis addresses problems concerning security of interconnected systems that
are subject to random (stochastic) disturbances. Our contribution is twofold. First, we
investigate whether, and to what extent, coordination among different subsystems and
knowledge of the global system dynamics is necessary to detect attacks in interconnected
viii
systems. We consider centralized and decentralized detectors, which differ primarily in
their knowledge of the system model, and characterize the performance of the two detectors
and show that, depending on the system and attack parameters, each of the detectors can
outperform the other. Hence, it may be possible for the decentralized detector to outperform
its centralized counterpart, despite having less information about the system dynamics. We
provide an explanation for this counter-intuitive result and illustrate our results through
simulations. Second, we study an attack design problem for interconnected systems where
the attacker compromises a subsystem at each time, based on a pre-computed probabilistic
rule. The goal of the attacker is to degrade the system performance, which is measured based
on a quadratic function of the system state, while remaining undetected from a centralized
detector. We show that selectively compromising different subsystems over time increases
the severity of the attacks with respect to compromising a fixed subsystem at each time.
We study another related security problem for network systems, where changes
in the statistical properties of an input driving certain network nodes has to be detected
by remotely located sensors. To detect the changes, we associate a maximum-a-posteriori
detector for a given set of sensors, and study its detection performance as function of the
network topology, and the graphical distance between the input and sensor locations. We
derive conditions under which the detection performance obtained when sensors are located
on a network cut is not worse (resp. not better) than the performance obtained by measuring
all nodes of the subnetwork induced by the cut and not containing the input nodes. Our
results provide insights into the sensor placement from a detection-theoretic point of view.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern dynamical systems are increasingly becoming more distributed, diverse,
complex and integrated with cyber (computation and communication) components. Typ-
ically, these systems are composed of multiple subsystems, which are interconnected via
physical or virtual couplings among the states of subsystems. An example such system is
the smart grid, which arises from the interconnection of smaller power systems at differ-
ent geographical locations, and whose performance depends on other critical infrastructures
including the transportation network and the water system. In contrast with legacy dynam-
ical systems (which include traditional control systems), typically isolated from the outer
world, the cyber and physical components of modern dynamical systems are interconnected
via local data networks, and connected to the outer world via the Internet. This poses sig-
nificant risks to personal privacy, economic security, and infrastructure. Further, the fact
that each subsystem usually has only partial knowledge or measurements of other inter-
connected units, the security question arises as to whether sophisticated attackers can hide
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their action to the individual subsystems while inducing system-wide critical perturbations.
Due to the vital role of these systems in everyday life, ensuring security of these systems,
as of today, is one of the main focuses of the National Security [59].
Concerns regarding security of dynamical systems are not new, as several publi-
cations on systems fault diagnosis isolation, and recovery testify; see for example [4, 34].
Interconnected dynamical systems integrated with cyber and communication components,
however, suffer from specific vulnerabilities which do not affect classical dynamical systems,
and for which appropriate attack detection and isolation techniques need to be developed.
For instance, relying on wireless communication networks to transmit measurements and
control signals heavily increases the possibility of intentional and malignant attacks against
various subsystems. Instead, traditional IT security methods, such as authentication and
cryptography methods, are not always adequate for satisfactory protection of dynamical
systems. The famous Stuxnet attack [26] is an excellent example to demonstrate the fact
that IT security methods do not exploit the compatibility of the measurements with the
underlying physical process and control mechanism, which are the primary objective of a
protection scheme [10]. In fact, the supreme level of sophistication of Stuxnet attack pre-
vented some well known anti-virus software to detect it initially [42]. Moreover, the existing
IT security methods are also not effective against insider attacks carried out by authorized
entities, for instance the Maroochy Water Breach case [73], and they also fail against attacks
targeting directly the physical dynamics [19].
With security emerging as a major concern for dynamical systems, different mod-
eling frameworks and protection schemes have been proposed for a variety of systems and
2
attacks; see for example survey papers [69, 48, 30, 21]. Contrary to these existing works,
in this thesis, we study the performance limitations of several attack detection schemes for
both interconnected and networked dynamical systems. The main contributions of each
chapter are summarized below:
In chapter 2, we consider a security problem for interconnected systems governed
by linear, discrete, time-invariant, stochastic dynamics, where the objective is to detect
exogenous attacks by processing the measurements at different locations. We consider two
classes of detectors, namely centralized and decentralized detectors, which differ primarily
in their knowledge of the system model. In particular, a decentralized detector has a model
of the dynamics of the isolated subsystems, but is unaware of the interconnection signals
that are exchanged among subsystems. Instead, a centralized detector has a model of the
entire dynamical system. We characterize the performance of the two detectors and show
that, depending on the system and attack parameters, each of the detectors can outperform
the other. In particular, it may be possible for the decentralized detector to outperform its
centralized counterpart, despite having less information about the system dynamics, and
this surprising property is due to the nature of the considered attack detection problem. To
complement our results on the detection of attacks, we propose and solve an optimization
problem to design attacks that maximally degrade the system performance while maintain-
ing a pre-specified degree of detectability. Finally, we validate our findings via numerical
studies on an electric power system.
In chapter 3, we study an attack design problem for interconnected systems where
the attacker compromises a subsystem at each time, which is selected randomly based on
3
a pre-computed probabilistic policy. The objective of the attacker is to degrade the system
performance, which is measured based on a quadratic function of the system state, while
remaining undetected from a centralized detector. First, we derive an explicit expression
for the detection probability, analyze its properties, and compute an upper bound. Then,
we use our upper bound to formulate and numerically solve an optimization problem for
the computation of optimal attack strategies. Finally, we validate our results and show that
our probabilistic attack strategy outperforms a constant attack strategy that compromises
a fixed subsystem at each time.
In chapter 4, we consider the optimal sensor placement problem in a network
system for detecting abrupt changes in the statistical properties of a stationary stochastic
input driving certain network nodes, under the constraint that the sensor locations should
be at least a specified distance apart from the input nodes. This specific detection problem
is motivated by emerging monitoring needs for cyber-physical networks, where intrusions
or abnormalities in cyber and human components may cause subtle changes in stochastic
driving or input signals, and ultimately incur significant risk to the network operation. As it
may be impractical or impossible to directly monitor these input signals, we exploit network
structure to identify changes in the driving signals. We consider two scenarios: one in which
the changes occurs in the mean of the input, and the other where the changes are allowed
to happen in the covariance of the input. In both the scenarios, to detect the changes,
we associate a maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) detector for a given set of sensors, and study
its detection performance as function of the network topology, and the graphical distance
between the input nodes and the sensors location. When the input and measurement noise
4
follows a Gaussian distribution, we show that, as the number of measurements goes to
infinity, the MAP detectors’ performance can be studied using the input-output transfer
function matrix gain of the network system. We derive conditions under which the detection
performance obtained when sensors are located on a network cut is not worse (respectively
not better) than the performance obtained by measuring all nodes of the subnetwork induced
by the cut and not containing the input nodes. Our results provide structural insights into
the sensor placement from a detection-theoretic viewpoint. Finally, we illustrate our findings
through numerical examples.
We conclude the thesis with chapter 5, in which we also discuss some aspects for
future research in the area of secure dynamical systems. We will also indicate possibilities
of harnessing the power of Random Matrix Theory to develop suitable tools to analyze
security in data-driven dynamical systems.
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Chapter 2
Centralized Versus Decentralized
Detection of Attacks in Stochastic
Interconnected Systems
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we investigate whether, and to what extent, coordination among
different subsystems and knowledge of the global system dynamics is necessary to detect
attacks in interconnected systems. In fact, while existing approaches for the detection of
faults and attacks typically rely on a centralized detector [61, 49, 13], the use of local
detectors would not only be computationally convenient, but it would also prevent the
subsystems from disclosing private information about their plants. As a counterintuitive
result, we will show that local and decentralized detectors can, in some cases, outperform a
6
centralized detector, thus supporting the development of distributed and localized theories
and tools for the security of cyber-physical systems.
Main contributions: This work features three main contributions. First, we propose
centralized and decentralized schemes to detect unknown and unmeasurable sensor attacks
in stochastic interconnected systems. Our detection schemes are based on the statistical
decision theoretic framework that falls under the category of simple versus composite hy-
potheses testing. We characterize the probability of false alarm and the probability of
detection for both detectors, as a function of the system and attack parameters. Second,
we compare the performance of the centralized and decentralized detectors, and show that
each detector can outperform the other for certain system and attack configurations. We
discuss that this counterintuitive phenomenon is inherent with the simple versus composite
nature of the considered attack detection problem, and provide numerical examples of this
behavior. Third, we formulate and solve an optimization problem to design attacks against
interconnected systems that maximally affect the system performance as measured by the
mean square deviation of the state while remaining undetected by the centralized and de-
centralized detectors with a pre-selected probability. Finally, we validate our theoretical
findings on the IEEE RTS-96 power system model.
Related Work: Centralized attack detectors have been the subject of extensive research in
the last years [92, 27, 74, 46, 94, 55, 53, 14, 41], where the detector has complete knowledge
of the system dynamics and all measurements. Furthermore, these studies use techniques
from various disciplines including game theory, information theory, fault detection and sig-
nal processing, and have a wide variety of applications [49]. Instead, decentralized attack
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detectors, where each local detector decides on attacks based on partial information and
measurements about the system, and local detectors cooperate to improve their detection
capabilities, have received only limited and recent attention [22, 58, 40, 95, 33]. Decentral-
ized detection schemes have also been studied for fault detection and isolation (FDI). In such
schemes, multiple local detectors make inferences about either the global or local process,
and transmit their local decisions to a central entity, which uses appropriate fusion rules to
make the global decision[78, 84, 11, 3, 66]. Methods to improve the detection performance
by exchanging information among the local detectors have also been proposed [90, 71, 29].
These decentralized algorithms are typically complex [61], their effectiveness in detecting
unknown and unmeasurable attacks is difficult to characterize, and their performance is
believed to be inferior when compared to their centralized counterparts. To the best of our
knowledge, a rigorous comparison of centralized and decentralized attack detection schemes
is still lacking, which prevents us from assessing whether, and to what extent, decentralized
and distributed schemes should be employed for attack detection.
2.2 Problem setup and preliminary notions
We consider an interconnected system with N subsystems, where each subsystem
obeys the discrete-time linear dynamics
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k) +Biui(k) + wi(k),
yi(k) = Cixi(k) + vi(k),
(2.1)
with i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. In the above equation, the vectors xi ∈ Rni and yi ∈ Rri are the state
and measurement of the i−th subsystem, respectively. The process noise wi(k) ∼ N (0,Σwi)
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and the measurement noise vi(k) ∼ N (0,Σvi) are independent stochastic processes, and wi
is assumed to be independent of vi, for all k ≥ 0. Further, the noise vectors across different
subsystems are assumed to be independent at all times. The i−th subsystem is coupled
with the other subsystems through the term Biui, which takes the form
Bi =
[
Ai1 · · · Ai,i−1 Ai,i+1 · · · AiN
]
, and
ui =
[
xT1 · · · xTi−1 xTi+1 · · · xTN
]T
.
The input Biui =
∑N
j 6=iAijxj represents the cumulative effect of subsystems j on subsystem
i. Hence, we refer to Bi as to the interconnection matrix, and to ui as to the interconnection
signal, respectively. We allow for the presence of attacks compromising the dynamics of
the subsystems, and model such attacks as exogenous unknown inputs. In particular, the
dynamics of the i−th subsystem under the attack uai with matrix Bai read as
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k) +Biui(k) +B
a
i u
a
i (k) + wi(k), (2.2)
where uai ∈ Rmi . In vector form, the dynamics of overall system under attack read as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k) + w(k),
y(k) = Cx(k) + v(k),
(2.3)
where φ =
[
φT1 . . . φ
T
N
]
, with φ standing for x ∈ Rn, w ∈ Rn, ua ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rr, v ∈ Rr,
n =
∑N
i=1 ni, m =
∑N
i=1mi, and r =
∑N
i ri. Moreover, as the components of the vectors w
and v are independent and Gaussian, w ∼ N (0,Σw) and v ∼ N (0,Σv), respectively, where
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Σw = blkdiag (Σw1 , . . . ,ΣwN ) and Σv = blkdiag (Σv1 , . . . ,ΣvN ). Further,
A =

A11 · · · A1N
...
. . .
...
AN1 · · · ANN
 , B
a =

Ba1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · BaN
 ,
and C = blkdiag (C1, . . . , CN ).
We assume that each subsystem is equipped with a local detector, which uses the
local measurements and knowledge of the local dynamics to detect the presence of local
attacks. In particular, the i−th local detector has access to the measurements yi in (2.1),
knows the matrices Aii, Bi, and Ci, and the statistical properties of the noise vectors wi
and vi. Yet, the i−th local detector does not know or measure the interconnection input ui,
and the attack parameters Bai and u
a
i . Based on this information, the i−th local detector
aims to detect whether Bai u
a
i 6= 0. The decisions of the local detectors are then processed
by a decentralized detector, which aims to detect the presence of attacks against the whole
interconnected system based on the local decisions. Finally, we assume the presence of a
centralized detector, which has access to the measurements y in (2.3), and knows the matrix
A and the statistical properties of the overall noise vectors w and v. Similarly to the local
detectors, the centralized detector does not know or measure the attack parameters Ba and
ua, and aims to detect whether Baua 6= 0. We postpone description of our detectors to
Section 2.3. To conclude this section, note that the decentralized and centralized detectors
have access to the same measurements. Yet, these detectors differ in their knowledge of the
system dynamics, which determines their performance as explained in Section 2.4.
Remark 1 (Control input and initial state) The system setup in (2.2) and (2.3) typ-
10
ically includes a control input. However, assuming that each subsystem knows its control
input, it can be omitted without affecting generality. Further, as the detectors do not have
information about the initial state, we assume without loss of generality, that the initial
state is deterministic and unknown to the detectors. 
2.3 Local, decentralized, and centralized detectors
In this section we formally describe our local, decentralized, and centralized detec-
tors, and characterize their performance as a function of the available measurements and
knowledge of the system dynamics. To this aim, let T > 0 be an arbitrary time horizon
and define the vectors
Yi =
[
yTi (1) y
T
i (2) · · · yTi (T )
]T
, (2.4)
which contains the measurements available to the i−th detector, and
Yc =
[
yT(1) yT(2) · · · yT(T )
]T
, (2.5)
which contains the measurements available to the centralized detector. Both the local and
centralized detectors perform the following three operations in order:
1. Collect measurements as in (2.4) and (2.5), respectively;
2. Process measurements to filter unknown variables; and
3. Perform statistical hypotheses testing to detect attacks (locally or globally) using the
processed measurements.
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The decisions of the local detectors are then used by the decentralized detector, which
triggers an alarm if any of the local detectors does so. We next characterize how the detectors
process their measurements and perform attack detection via statistical hypothesis testing.
2.3.1 Processing of measurements
The measurements (2.4) and (2.5) depend on parameters that are unknown to
the detectors, namely, the system initial state and the interconnection signal (although the
process and measurement noises are also unknown, the detectors know their statistical prop-
erties). Thus, to test for the presence of attacks, the detectors first process the measurement
vectors to eliminate their dependency on the unknown parameters. To do so, using equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2), define the observability matrix and the attack, interconnection, and
noise forced response matrices of the i−th subsystem as
Oi =

CiAii
...
CiA
T
ii
 , F
(a)
i =

CiB
a
i . . . 0
...
. . .
...
CiA
T−1
ii B
a
i . . . CiB
a
i
 ,
F (u)i =

CiBi . . . 0
...
. . .
...
CiA
T−1
ii Bi . . . CiBi
 , F
(w)
i =

Ci . . . 0
...
. . .
...
CiA
T−1
ii . . . Ci
 .
Analogously, for the system model (2.3) define the matrices Oc, F (w)a , and F (w)c , which are
constructed as above by replacing Ai, B
a
i , and Ci with A, B
a, and C, respectively. The
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measurements (2.4) and (2.5) can be written as follows:
Yi = Oixi(0) + F (u)i Ui + F (a)i Uai + F (w)i Wi + Vi, (2.6)
Yc = Ocx(0) + F (a)c Ua + F (w)c W + V, (2.7)
where Ui =
[
uTi (0) u
T
i (1) · · · uTi (T − 1)
]T
. The vectors Uai , U
a, Wi and W are the
time aggregated signals of uai , u
a, wi, and w, respectively, and are defined similarly to Ui.
Instead, Vi =
[
vTi (1) v
T
i (2) · · · vTi (T )
]T
, and V is defined similarly to Vi. To eliminate
the dependency from the unknown variables, let Ni and Nc be bases of the left null spaces
of the matrices
[
Oi F (u)i
]
and Oc, respectively, and define the processed measurements as
Y˜i = NiYi = Ni
[
F (a)i Uai + F (w)i Wi + Vi
]
,
Y˜c = NcYc = Nc
[
F (a)c Ua + F (w)c W + V
]
,
(2.8)
where the expressions for Y˜i and Y˜c follows from (2.6) and (2.7). Notice that, in the absence
of attacks (Ua = 0), the measurements Y˜i and Y˜c depend only on the system noise. Instead,
in the presence of attacks, such measurements depend on the attack vector, which may leave
a signature for the detectors.1 We now characterize the statistical properties of Y˜i and Y˜c.
Lemma 2 (Statistical properties of the processed measurements) The processed
measurements Y˜i and Y˜c satisfy
Y˜i ∼ N (βi,Σi) , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and
Y˜c ∼ N (βc,Σc) ,
(2.9)
1If Im(Bai ) ⊆ Im(Bi), then NiF (a)i = 0 and the processed measurements do not depend on the attack.
Thus, our local detection technique can only be successful against attacks that do not satisfy this condition.
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where
βi = NiF (a)i Uai ,
βc = NcF (a)c Ua,
Σi = Ni
[(
F (w)i
)
(IT ⊗ Σwi)
(
F (w)i
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
NTi ,
Σc = Nc
[(
F (w)c
)
(IT ⊗ Σw)
(
F (w)c
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σv)
]
NTc .
(2.10)
A proof of Lemma 2 is postponed to the Appendix. From Lemma 2, the mean
vectors βi and βc depend on the attack vector, while the covariance matrices Σi and Σc are
independent of the attack. This observation motivates us to develop a detection mechanism
based on the mean of the processed measurements, rather the covariance matrices.
2.3.2 Statistical hypothesis testing framework
In this section we detail our attack detection mechanism, which we assume to be
the same for all local and centralized detectors, and we characterize its false alarm and
detection probabilities. We start by analyzing the test procedure of the i−th local detector.
Let H0 be the null hypothesis, where βi = 0 and the system is not under attack, and let H1
be the alternative hypothesis, where βi 6= 0 and the system is under attack. To decide which
hypothesis is true, or equivalently whether the mean value of the processed measurements
is zero, we resort to the generalized log-likelihood ratio test (GLRT):
Λi , Y˜ Ti Σ−1i Y˜i
H1
≷
H0
τi, (2.11)
where the threshold τi ≥ 0 is selected based on the desired false alarm probability of the test
(2.11) [65]. For a statistical hypothesis testing problem, the false alarm probability equals
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the probability of deciding for H1 when H0 is true, while the detection probability equals
the probability of deciding for H1 when H1 is true. While the former is used for tuning the
threshold, the latter is used for measuring the performance of the test. Formally, the false
alarm and detection probabilities of (2.11) are the probabilities that are conditioned on the
hypothesis H0 and H1, respectively, and are symbolically denoted as
PFi = Pr [Λi ≥ τi|H0] and PDi = Pr [Λi ≥ τi|H1] .
Similarly, the centralized detector test is defined as
Λc , Y˜ Tc Σ−1c Y˜c
H1
≷
H0
τc, (2.12)
where τc ≥ 0 is a preselected threshold, and its false alarm and detection probabilities are
denoted as PFc and P
D
c . We next characterize the false alarm and detection probabilities
of the detectors with respect to the system and attack parameters.
Lemma 3 (False alarm and detection probabilities of local and centralized de-
tectors) The false alarm and the detection probabilities of the tests (2.11) and (2.12) are,
respectively,
PFi = Q(τi; pi, 0), P
D
i = Q(τi; pi, λi), and
PFc = Q(τc; pc, 0), P
D
c = Q(τc; pc, λc),
(2.13)
where
pi = Rank(Σi), pc = Rank(Σc),
λi = (U
a
i )
TMi(U
a
i ), λc = (U
a)TMc(U
a),
(2.14)
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and
Mi =
(
NiF (a)i
)T
Σ−1i
(
NiF (a)i
)
,
Mc =
(
NcF (a)c
)T
Σ−1c
(
NcF (a)c
)
.
(2.15)
Lemma 3, whose proof is postponed to the Appendix, allows us to compute the
false alarm and detection probabilities of the detectors using the decision thresholds, the
system parameters, and the attack vector. Moreover, for fixed PFi and P
F
c , the detection
thresholds are computed as τc = Q
−1(PFc ; pc, 0) and τi = Q−1(PFi ; pi, 0), where Q
−1(·) is the
inverse of the complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) that is associated
with a central chi-squared distribution. The parameters pi, pc and λi, λc in Lemma 3 are
referred to as degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameters of the detectors.
Remark 4 (System theoretic interpretation of detection probability parameters)
The degrees of freedom and the non-centrality parameters quantify the knowledge of the
detectors about the system dynamics and the energy of the attack signal contained in the
processed measurements. In particular:
(Degrees of freedom pi) The detection probability and the false alarm probability are both
increasing functions of the degrees of freedom pi, because the Q function in (2.13) is an
increasing function of pi. Thus, increasing pi by increasing the number of sensors or the
horizon T , does not necessarily lead to an improvement of the detector performance.
(Non-centrality parameter λi) The non-centrality parameter λi measures the energy of the
attack signal contained in the processed measurements. In the literature of communication
and signal processing, the non-centrality parameter is often referred to as signal to noise
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ratio (SNR) [65]. For fixed τi and pi, the detection probability increases monotonically with
λi, and approaches the false alarm probability as λi tends to zero.
(Decision threshold τi) For fixed λi and pi, the probability of detection and the false alarm
probability are monotonically decreasing functions of the detection threshold τi. This is due
to the fact that the complementary CDFs, which define the false alarm and detection proba-
bilities, are decreasing functions of τi. As we show later, because of the contrasting behaviors
of the false alarm and detection probabilities with respect to all individual parameters, the
decentralized detector can outperform the centralized detector. 
We now state a result that provides a relation between the degrees of freedom
(pi and pc) and the non-centrality parameters (λi and λc) of the local and the centralized
detectors. This result plays a central role in comparing the performance of these centralized
and decentralized detectors.
Lemma 5 (Degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameters) Let pi, pc and λi,
λc be the degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameters of the i−th local and centralized
detectors, respectively. Then, pi≤pc and λi≤λc for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
A proof of Lemma 5 is postponed to the Appendix. In loose words, given the
interpretation of the degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameters in Remark 4, Lemma
(5) states that a centralized detector has more knowledge about the system dynamics (pi ≤
pc) and its measurements contain a stronger attack signature (λi ≤ λc) than any of the
i−th local detector. Despite these properties, we will show that the decentralized detector
can outperform the centralized one.
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2.4 Comparison of centralized and decentralized detection of
attacks
In this section we characterize the detection probabilities of the decentralized and
centralized detectors, and we derive sufficient conditions for each detector to outperform the
other. Recall that the decentralized detector triggers an alarm if any of the local detectors
detects an alarm. In other words,
PFd = Pr [Λi ≥ τi, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} |H0] ,
PDd = Pr [Λi ≥ τi, for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N} |H1] ,
(2.16)
where PFd and P
D
d denote the false alarm and detection probabilities of the decentralized
detector, respectively.
Lemma 6 (Performance of the decentralized detector) The false alarm and detection
probabilities in (2.16) satisfy
PFd = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
, and PDd = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
. (2.17)
A proof of Lemma 6 is postponed to the Appendix. As shown in Fig. 2.1, for the
case when PFi = P
F
j , for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, PFd increases with increase in PFi and N . To
allow for a fair comparison between the decentralized and centralized detectors, we assume
that PFc = P
F
d . Consequently, for a probability P
F
c , the probabilities P
F
i satisfy
PFc = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
.
We now derive a sufficient condition for the centralized detector to outperform the
decentralized detector.
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Figure 2.1: This figure shows the false alarm probability of the decentralized detector, PFd ,
as a function of the identical false alarm probabilities of the local detectors, PFi , for different
numbers of local detectors.
Theorem 7 (Sufficient condition for PDc ≥ PDd ) Let PFc = PFd , and assume that the
following condition is satisfied:
τc ≤ pc + λc −
√
4N(pc + 2λc) ln
(
1
1− PDmax
)
, (2.18)
where PDmax = max{PD1 , . . . , PDN }. Then, PDc ≥ PDd .
A proof of Theorem 7 is postponed to the Appendix. We next derive a sufficient
condition for the decentralized detector to outperform the centralized detector.
Theorem 8 (Sufficient condition for PDd ≥ PDc ) Let PFc = PFd , and assume that the
following condition is satisfied:
τc ≥ pc + λc +
√
4 (pc + 2λc) ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)
+
+ 2 ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)
,
(2.19)
where PDmin = min{PD1 , . . . , PDN }. Then PDd ≥ PDc .
A proof of Theorem 7 is postponed to the Appendix. Theorems 7 and 8 provide
sufficient conditions on the detectors and attack parameters that result in one detector
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outperforming the other. In particular, from (2.18) and (2.19) we note that, depending on
decision threshold τc, a centralized detector may or may not outperform a decentralized
detector. This is intuitive as the Q function, which quantifies the detection probability, is a
decreasing function of the detection threshold (see Remark 4). To clarify the effect of attack
and detection parameters on the performance trade-offs of the detectors, we now express
(2.18) and (2.19) using the mean and standard deviation of Λc in (2.12). Let
µc , E [Λc] = λc + pc, and σc , SD[Λc] =
√
2(pc + 2λc).
where the expectation and standard deviation (SD) of Λc follows from the fact that under
H1, Λc ∼ χ2(pc, λc) (see proof of Lemma 3). Hence, (2.18) and (2.19) can be rewritten,
respectively, as
τc ≤ µc − σc
√
2N ln
(
1
1− PDmax
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,κc
, and (2.20a)
τc ≥ µc + σc
√
2 ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,κd
+κ2d. (2.20b)
From (2.20a) and (2.20b) we note that a centralized detector outperforms the decentralized
one if τc is κc standard deviations smaller than the mean µc. Instead, a decentralized
detector outperforms the centralized detector if τc is at least κd standard deviations larger
than the mean µc. See Fig. 2.2 for a graphical illustration of this interpretation. Theorems
7 and 8 are illustrated in Fig. 2.3 as a function of the non-centrality parameters. It can be
observed that (i) each of the detectors can outperform the other depending on the values of
the noncentrality parameter values, (ii) the provided bounds qualitatively capture the actual
performance of the centralized and decentralized detectors as the non-centrality parameters
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Figure 2.2: This figure shows the probability density function of Λc under H1, as a function
of threshold τc. For τc = µc − κcσc and τc = µc + κdσd + σ2d, the shaded area in panels (a)
and (b) indicates the detection probability of the centralized detector. As seen in panels
(a) and (b), an increase in κc results in larger area (larger detection probability) while a
increase in κd results in smaller area (smaller detection probability).
increase, and (iii) the provided bounds are rather tight over a large range of non-centrality
parameters. In Fig. 2.4 we show that the difference of the detection probabilities of the
centralized and decentralized detectors can be large, especially when the non-centrality
parameters satisfy λc ≈ λi, as evident in Fig. 2.4 (a).
2.5 Design of optimal attacks
In this section we consider the problem of designing attacks that deteriorate the
performance of the interconnected system (2.1) while remaining undetected from the cen-
tralized and decentralized detectors. We measure the degradation induced by an attack
with the expected value of the deviation of the state trajectory from the origin. We assume
that the attack is a deterministic signal, and thus independent of the noise affecting the
system dynamics and measurements. In particular, for a fixed value of the probability PFc
21
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Figure 2.3: This figure shows when the decentralized, which comprises identical local de-
tectors, and centralized detectors outperform their counterpart, as a function of the non-
centrality parameters. The regions identified by solid markers correspond to the conditions
in Theorems 7 and 8. Instead, regions identified by empty markers are identified numerically.
Since λi ≤ λc, the white region is not admissible. For PFc = PFd = 0.01, (a) corresponds to
N = 2 and (b) corresponds to the case of N = 4. When N = 4, the decentralized detector
outperforms the centralized one for a larger set of noncentrality parameters.
and a threshold PFc ≤ δc ≤ 1, we consider the optimization problem
(P.1) max
Ua
E
[
T∑
k=1
x(k)Tx(k)
]
,
subject to PDc ≤ δc,
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k) + w(k),
where Ua is the deterministic attack input over time horizon T (see (2.7)). Notice that,
because the attack is deterministic, the objective function in (P.1) can be simplified by
bringing the expectation inside the summation, and replacing the state equation constraint
with the mean state response. Further, because the system parameters and PFc are fixed, τc
and pc are also fixed, which ensures that P
D
d only depends on noncentrality parameter. This
observation along with the fact that Q(·) is increasing function in noncentrality parameter
(see Remark 4) allows us to express the detection constraint in terms of λc. Specifically,
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Figure 2.4: This figure shows the difference of the centralized and decentralized detection
probabilities as a function of λi for different values of λc. For small values of λc, the detection
probability of the decentralized detector can be very large than its centralized counterpart.
the optimization problem (P.1) can be rewritten as
(P.2) max
Ua
T∑
k=1
x(k)Tx(k)
subject to (Ua)TMc(U
a) ≤ δ˜c,
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k),
where we have used that Cov [x(k)] is independent of the attack ua(k), and
E[x(k)Tx(k)] = x(k)Tx(k) + Trace (Cov [x(k)]) ,
with x(k) = E[x(k)]. Further, we have δ˜c = Q−1pc,τc(δc), where Q
−1
pc,τc(α) : [0, 1] → [0,∞]
denotes the inverse of Q(τc; pc, λc) for fixed pc and τc, and λc = (U
a)TMc(U
a), with Mc
as in (2.15). It should be noticed that the attack constraint in (P.2) essentially limits the
energy of the attack signal. We next characterize the solution to the problem (P.2).
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Theorem 9 (Optimal attack vectors) Let U∗c be any solution of (P.2). Then, there
exist a γc > 0 such that the pair (U
∗
c , γc) solves the following optimality equations:
[
BTaBa − γcMc
]
U∗c + BTaAx(0) = 0, (2.21a)
(U∗c )
TMc(U
∗
c ) = δ˜c, (2.21b)
where
A =

A
...
AT
 and Ba =

Ba · · · 0
...
. . .
...
AT−1Ba . . . Ba
 . (2.22)
A proof of Theorem 9 is postponed to the Appendix. Theorem 9 not only guar-
antees the existence of optimal attacks, but it also provides us with necessary conditions to
verify if an attack is (locally) optimal. When the system initial state is zero, we can also
quantify the performance degradation induced by an optimal attack. Let ρmax(A,B) and
νmax(A,B) denote a largest generalized eigenvalue of a matrix pair (A,B) and one of its
associated generalized eigenvectors [18].
Lemma 10 (System degradation with zero initial state) Let x(0) = 0. Then, the
optimal solution to (P.2) is
U∗c =
√ δ˜c
(ν∗)TMc(ν∗)
 ν∗, (2.23)
and its associated optimal cost is
J∗c = δ˜c ρmax
(
BTaBa,Mc
)
, (2.24)
where ν∗ = νmax
(BTaBa,Mc).
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A proof of Lemma 10 is postponed to the Appendix. From (2.24), note that the
system degradation caused by an optimal attack depends on the detector’s tolerance, as
measured by δ˜c, and the system dynamics, as measured by ρmax (·). See Remark 12 for the
influence of noise uncertainty on the system degradation due to optimal attacks.
Remark 11 (Optimal attack vector against decentralized detector) To character-
ize the performance degradation of the system analytically, we consider a relaxed form of
detection constraint. Specifically, we design optimal attacks subjected to P
D
d ≤ δd instead
of PDd ≤ δd, where P
D
d is an upper bound on P
D
d (see Lemma 14). The design of optimal
attacks that are undetectable from the decentralized detector can be formulated as:
(P.3) max
Ua
T∑
k=1
x(k)Tx(k)
subject to
N∑
i=1
(Uai )
TMi(U
a
i ) ≤ δ˜d,
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Baua(k),
where the summation in the detectability constraint follows from Lemma 14 and the fact that
P
D
d ≤ δd becomes equivalent to
∑N
i=1 λi ≤ δ˜d, where δ˜d = Q−1psum,τmin(δd), psum =
∑N
i=1 pi,
and τmin = min
1≤i≤N
τi. Let Πi be a permutation matrix such that U
a
i = ΠiU
a, and let Π =[
ΠT1 , . . . ,Π
T
N
]T
and Md = Π
Tblkdiag(M1, . . . ,MN )Π. For any solution U
∗
d of (P.2), there
exist γd > 0 such that the pair (U
∗
d , γd) solves the following optimality equations:
[
BTaBa − γdMd
]
U∗d + BTaAx(0) = 0, and
(U∗d )
TMd(U
∗
d ) = δ˜d.
Further, if x(0) = 0, then the largest degradation is J∗d = δ˜d ρmax
(BTaBa,Md). 
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Remark 12 (Maximum degradation of the system performance with respect to
system noise) To see the role of noise level, in the processed measurements, on the system
degradation, we consider the following covariance matrices: Σwi = σ
2Ini and Σvi = σ
2Iri,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, from (2.24) we have
J∗c = σ
2 δ˜c
[
ρmax
(
BTaBa, M˜c
)]
, (2.25)
where M˜c =
(
NcF (a)c
)T [F (w)c (F (w)c )T + I]−1 (NcF (a)c ). From (2.25) we note that the
system degradation increases with the increase in the noise level, i.e., σ2. 
2.6 Numerical comparison of centralized and decentralized
detectors
In this section, we demonstrate our theoretical findings on the IEEE RTS-96 power
network model [32], which we partition into three subregions as shown in Fig. 2.5. We
followed the approach in [23] to obtain a linear time-invariant model of the power network,
and then discretized it using a sampling time of 0.01 seconds. For a false alarm probability
PFc = P
F
d = 0.05, we consider the family of attacks U
a =
√
θ/(1TMc1)1, where 1 is the
vector of all ones and θ > 0. It can be shown that the noncentrality parameters satisfy
λc = θ and λi = θ(1
TMi1)/(1
TMc1), and moreover, the choice of vector 1 is arbitrary and
it does not affecting the following results.
(Illustration of Theorem 7) For the measurement horizon of T = 100 seconds, the values of pc
and τc are 5130 and 5480.6, respectively. Fig. 2.6 show that the detection probabilities of the
centralized and decentralized detectors increase monotonically with the attack parameter
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Figure 2.5: The figure shows a single-line diagram of IEEE RTS-96 power network, which
is composed of three weakly-coupled areas (subsystems). The square nodes denote the
generators, while the circular nodes denotes the load buses of the network [23].
θ. As predicted by the condition (2.20a) and shown in Fig. 2.6, the centralized detector is
guaranteed to outperform the decentralized detector when θ > 173. This figure shows that
our result is conservative, because PDc ≥ PDd for all values of θ as shown in Fig. 2.6.
(Illustration of Theorem 8) Contrary to the previous example, by letting T = 125 seconds,
we obtain pc = 6755 and τc = 6947.3. For these parameters, the decentralized detector is
guaranteed to outperform the centralized one when θ ≤ 511. This behavior is predicted by
our sufficient condition (2.20b), and is illustrated in Fig. 2.6. The estimation provided by
our condition (2.20b) is conservative, as illustrated in Fig. 2.6.
(Illustration of Lemma 10) In Fig. 2.7 we compare the performance degradation induced
by the optimal attacks designed according to the optimization problems (P.2) and (P.3)
with zero initial conditions. In particular, we plot the optimal costs J∗c and J∗d against
the tolerance levels δ˜c and δ˜d, respectively. As expected, the performance degradation is
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Figure 2.6: Scenarios in which the centralized detector outperforms the decentralized de-
tector (a), and vice versa (b), on the IEEE RTS-96 power network, for a range of attack
parameter (θ) values. In panels (c) and (d) we plot the right (solid line) and left hand ex-
pressions (dashed line) of the inequalities (2.20a) and (2.20b), respectively, as a function of
θ. For attacks such that the time horizon T = 100 sec and θ > 200, the sufficient condition
(2.20a) holds true, it guarantees that PDc ≥ PDd . Instead, when T = 125 sec and θ < 500,
the sufficient condition (2.20b) holds true, it guarantees that PDd ≥ PDc .
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Figure 2.7: This figure shows the performance degradation induced by undetectable optimal
attacks on the IEEE RTS-96 power network. The performance degradation is computed
using the optimal cost J∗c and J∗d derived in Lemma 10 and Remark 11, respectively. Instead,
the maximum detection probability is given by the tuning parameters δc and δd in the
detection probability constraints of the optimization problems (P.2) and (P.3), respectively.
proportional to the tolerance levels and, for the considered setup, it is larger in the case of
the decentralized detector.
2.7 Summary
In this work we compare the performance of centralized and decentralized schemes
for the detection of attacks in stochastic interconnected systems. In addition to quantifying
the performance of each detection scheme, we prove the counterintuitive result that the
decentralized scheme can, at times, outperform its centralized counterpart, and that this
behavior results due to the simple versus composite nature of the attack detection problem.
We illustrate our findings through academic examples and a case study based on the IEEE
RTS-96 power system.
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2.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: Since the attack vectors Uai and U
a are deterministic, and Wi, Vi, V ,
and W are zero mean random vectors, from the linearity of the expectation operator it
follows from (2.8) that
βi , E[Y˜i] = NiF (a)i Uai , and βc , E[Y˜c] = NcF (a)c Uac .
Further, from the properties of Cov[·], we have the following:
Σi , Cov
[
Y˜i
]
= NiCov [Yi]N
T
i
(a)
= Ni
[
Cov
[
F (w)i Wi
]
+ Cov[Vi]
]
NTi
(b)
= Ni
[(
F (w)i
)
Cov [Wi]
(
F (w)i
)T
+ Cov[Vi]
]
NTi
= Ni
[(
F (w)i
)
(IT ⊗ Σwi)
(
F (w)i
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
NTi ,
where (a) follows because the measurement and process noises are independent of each
other. Instead, (b) is due to the fact that the noise vectors are independent and identically
distributed. Similar analysis also results in the expression of Σc, and hence the details are
omitted. Finally, by invoking the fact that linear transformations preserve Gaussianity, the
distribution of Y˜i and Y˜c is Gaussian as well. 
Proof of Lemma 3:
From the statistics and distributional form of Y˜i and Y˜c (see (2.9)), and threshold
tests defined in (2.11) and (2.12), it follows from [1, Theorem 3.3.3] that, under
1. H0: Λi ∼ χ2(pi) and Λc ∼ χ2(pc), where pi and pc are defined in (2.14).
2. H1: Λi ∼ χ2(pi, λi) and Λc ∼ χ2(pc, λc), where λi = βTi Σ−1i βi and λc = βTc Σ−1c βc.
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By substituting βi = NiF (a)i Uai and βc = NcF (a)c Uac (see Lemma 2) and rearranging the
terms, we get the expressions of λi and λc in (2.14). Finally, from the aforementioned
distributional forms of Λi and Λc, it now follows that the false alarm and the detection
probabilities of the tests (2.11) and (2.12) are the right tail probabilities (represented by
Q(·) function) of the central and noncentral chi-squared distributions, respectively. Hence,
the expressions in (2.13) follow. 
Proof of Lemma 5: Without loss of generality let i = 1. Thus, it suffices to show that a)
p1 ≤ pc and b) λ1 ≤ λc.
Case (a): For brevity, define
Σ˜i =
[(
F (w)i
)
(IT ⊗ Σwi)
(
F (w)i
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σvi)
]
and
Σ˜c =
[(
F (w)c
)
(IT ⊗ Σw)
(
F (w)c
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σv)
]
,
(2.26)
and note that Σ˜i > 0 and Σ˜c > 0. From Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and (2.26), we have
pc = Rank(Σc) = Rank
((
NcΣ˜
1/2
c
)(
NcΣ˜
1/2
c
)T)
= Rank
(
NcΣ˜
1/2
)
= Rank (Nc) .
Similarly, p1 = Rank (N1). Since, N
T
1 and N
T
c are a basis vectors of the null spaces NL1 and
NLc (see (2.37)) respectively, it follows from Proposition 13 that p1 ≤ pc.
Case (b): As the proof for this result is rather, we break it down in to multiple steps:
• Step 1 : Express λ1 and λc using the statistics of a permuted version of Yc.
• Step 2 : Obtain lower bound on λc, which depends on the statistics of the measure-
ments pertaining to Subsystem 1.
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• Step 3 : Show that λ1 is less than bound in Step 2.
Step 1 (alternative form of λ1 and λc): Notice that λ1 and λc in (2.14) can be expressed
as λ1 = β
T
1 Σ
−1
1 β1 and λc = β
T
c Σ
−1
c βc, respectively, where β1, βc, Σ1, and Σc are defined in
Lemma 2. For convenience, we express λ1 and λc in an alternative way. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
and consider the i−th sensor measurements of (2.3)
yc,i(k) =
[
0 · · · Ci · · · 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Cc,i
x(k) + vi(k). (2.27)
Also, define Yc,i =
[
yTc,i(1) . . . y
T
c,i(T )
]T
and Ŷc =
[
Y Tc,1 . . . Y
T
c,N
]
. Now, from (2.27)
and state equation in (2.3), Yc,i can be expanded as
Yc,i = Oc,ix(0) + F (a)c,i Ua + F (w)c,i W + Vi,
where the matrices Oc,i, F (a)c,i , and F (w)c,i are similar to the matrices defined in Section II-A.
By substituting the above decomposition of Yc,i in Ŷ we have
Ŷc =

Oc,1
...
Oc,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ôc
x(0) +

F (a)c,1
...
F (a)c,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
F̂ac
Ua +

F (w)c,1
...
F (w)c,N

︸ ︷︷ ︸
F̂wc
W + V.
Moreover, from the distributional assumptions on W and V , it readily follows that (similarly
to the proof of Lemma 2),
Ŷc ∼ N
(
Ôcx(0) + F̂ac Ua,Σ
)
, (2.28)
where Σ =
(
F̂wc
)
(IT ⊗ Σw)
(
F̂wc
)T
+ (IT ⊗ Σv), and Σw and Σv are defined in Lemma 2.
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Now, consider the measurement equation yi(k) in (2.1) and note that Cc,ix(k) =
Cixi(k). Thus, yi(k) = yc,i(k), for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k ∈ N. From this observation it
follows that Yi = Yc,i = ΠiŶc, where Πi is a selection matrix. Let N˜i = NiΠi and note that
N˜iÔ = NiOc,i. Further from Proposition 13 we have NiOc,i = 0. With these facts in place,
from Lemma 2 we now have
βi = N˜iF̂ac Ua and Σi = N˜iΣN˜Ti . (2.29)
Similarly, since Ŷc is just a rearrangement of Yc (see (2.5)), there exists a permutation
matrix Q such that Yc = QŶc, and, ultimately Y˜c = NcYc = NcQŶc. Thus,
βc = NcQF̂ac Ua and Σc = NcQΣ(NcQ)T. (2.30)
Let z = F̂ac Ua. From (2.29) and (2.30) we have
λ1 = z
TN˜T1
[
N˜1ΣN˜
T
1
]−1
N˜1z,
λc = z
T (NcQ)
T
[
(NcQ) Σ (NcQ)
T
]−1
(NcQ) z.
(2.31)
Step 2 (lower bound on λc): Since, Yc = NcYc = NcQŶc, it follows that NcQ is the basis
of the null space Ôc. Further, the row vectors of Oc,i and Oc,j are linearly independent,
whenever i 6= j. Using these facts we can define Nc,i =
[
N ic,i · · · NNc,i
]
such that NcQ =[
NTc,1 · · · NTc,N
]T
, where N ic,iOc,i = 0. Let P1 =
[
(Nc,2)
T · · · (Nc,N )T
]T
and note that
(NcQ) Σ (NcQ)
T =
Nc,1
P1
Σ [NTc,1 PT1
]
=
Nc,1ΣNTc,1 Nc,1ΣPT1
NTc,1ΣP1 P
T
1 ΣP1
 .
Let S1 = Nc,1ΣN
T
c,1. Since Σ > 0, it follows that both the matrices S1 and P
T
1 ΣP1 are
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invertible. Hence, from Schur’s complement, there exists a matrix X ≥ 0 such that
[
(NcQ) Σ (NcQ)
T
]−1
=
S−11 0
0 0
+X. (2.32)
Similarly, consider the following partition of Σ:
Σ =
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
 ,
where Σ11 > 0 and Σ22 > 0, and let S2 = (N
1
c,1)Σ11(N
1
c,1)
T. Invoking Schur’s complement,
we have the following:
S−11 =
S−12 0
0 0
+ Y, (2.33)
where Y ≥ 0. Substituting(2.32) and (2.33) in (2.31), it follows that
λc = z
T(NcQ)
T
S−11 0
0 0
 (NcQ)z + zT(NcQ)TX(NcQ)z︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥
[
(Nc,1z)
T (P1z)
T
]S−11 0
0 0

Nc,1z
P1z

= zT
(
NTc,1S
−1
1 Nc,1
)
z
= zT(Nc,1)
T
S−12 0
0 0
 (Nc,1)z + zT(Nc,1)TY (Nc,1)z︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ zT(Nc,1)T
S−12 0
0 0
 (Nc,1)z = zT
(N1c,1)TS−12 N1c,1 0
0 0
 z. (2.34)
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Instead, λ1 in (2.31) can be shown as
λ1 = z
T
NT1
[
N1Σ11N
T
1
]−1
N1 0
0 0
 z, (2.35)
where we used the fact that N˜1 = N1Π1.
Step 3 (λc ≥ λ1): For λc ≥ λ1 to hold true, it suffices to show the following:
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 ≥ NT1
[
N1Σ11N
T
1
]−1
N1.
By invoking Proposition 13, we note that there exists a full row rank matrix F1, such that
N1 = F1N
1
c,1. Since F
T
1 is a full column rank matrix, we can define an invertible matrix
F˜T1 ,
[
FT1 M
T
1
]
, where M1 forms a basis for null space of F1, such that the following holds
S−12 = F˜
T
1
[
F˜1S2F˜
T
1
]−1
F˜1 = F˜
T
1
F1S2FT1 F1S2MT1
M1S2F
T
1 M1S2M
T
1

−1
F˜1.
By invoking Schur’s complement, it follows thatF1S2FT1 F1S2MT1
M1S2F
T
1 M1S2M
T
1

−1
=

(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
0
0 0
+ Y,
where Z ≥ 0. Hence,
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 = (F˜1N
1
c,1)
T

(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
0
0 0
 (F˜1N1c,1) + (F˜1N1c,1)TZ(F˜1N1c,1).
By substituting F˜T1 = [F
T
1 M
T
1 ] in the above expression, and rearranging the terms we have
(N1c,1)
TS−12 N
1
c,1 = (F1N
1
c,1)
T
(
F1S2F
T
1
)−1
(F1N
1
c,1) + (F˜1N
1
c,1)
TZ(F˜1N
1
c,1).
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The required inequality follows by substituting S2 = (N
1
c,1)Σ11(N
1
c,1)
T and N1 = F1Nc,1,
and recalling the fact that the sum of two positive semi definite matrices is greater than or
equal to either of the matrices. 
Proof of Lemma 6: Let Ei be an event that the i−th local detector decides H1 when the
true hypothesis is H0. Then, P
F
i = Pr [Ei] . Let E{i be the complement of Ei. Then, from
(2.16) it follows that
PFd = Pr
(
N⋃
i=i
Ei
)
= 1− Pr
(
N⋂
i=i
E{i
)
(a)
= 1−
N∏
i=1
Pr
(
E{i
)
= 1−
N∏
i=1
(1− Pr (Ei)) = 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PFi
)
,
where for the (a) we used the fact that the events Ei are mutually independent for all
i ∈ {1, . . . N}. To see this fact, notice that the event Ei is defined on Y˜i (see (2.8)). Further,
Y˜i depends only on the deterministic attack signal U
a
i and the noise vectors Vi and Wi,
but not on the interconnection signal Ui (see (2.6)). Now, by invoking the fact that noises
variables across different subsystems are independent, it also follows that the events Ei are
also mutually independent. Similar procedure will lead to the analogous expression for PDd
and hence, the details are omitted. 
Proof of Theorem 7: Let µc = pc+λc and σc =
√
2(pc + 2λc), and assume that (2.18) holds
true. Then, from the monotonicity property of the CDF associated with the test statistic
Λc, which follows χ
2(pc, λc), we have the following inequality
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≤ Pr
[
Λc ≤ µc − σc
√
2N ln
(
1
1− PDmax
)]
.
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From the inequality (2.41b), it now follows that
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≤ exp
(
−N ln
(
1
1− PDmax
))
= exp
(
ln
(
1− PDmax
)N) ≤ N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
,
where for the last inequality we used the fact that PDi ≤ PDmax for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. By
using the above inequality and Lemma 3, under hypothesis H1, we have
PDc = 1− Pr [Λc ≤ τc|H1] ≥ 1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
= PDd . 
Proof of Theorem 8: Let µc = pc+λc and σc =
√
2(pc + 2λc), and assume that (2.19) holds
true. Then, from the monotonicity property of the CDF associated with the test statistic
Λc, which follows χ
2(pc, λc), we have the following inequality
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≥ Pr
[
Λc ≤ µc + σc
√
2 ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)
+ 2 ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
)]
.
From the inequality (2.41a), it now follows that
Pr [Λc ≤ τc] ≥ 1− exp
(
− ln
(
1
1− (1− PDmin)N
))
= 1− exp
(
ln
(
1− (1− PDmin)N)) ≥ N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)
= 1−
[
1−
N∏
i=1
(
1− PDi
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
PDd
.
The result follows by substituting PDc = 1− Pr [Λc ≤ τc|H1] in the above inequality. 
Proof of Theorem 9 By recursively expanding the equality constraint of the optimization
problem (P.2) we have
[
x(1) · · · x(T )
]
= Ax(0) + BaUa. From this identity, (P.2) can
also be expressed as
max
Ua
[Ax(0) + BaUa]T [Ax(0) + BaUa]︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(Ua)
subject to (Ua)TMc(U
a) ≤ δ˜c.
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From the first-order necessary conditions [16] we now have
∇
(
f(U∗c )− γ(U∗c )TMc(U∗c )
)
= 0, (2.36a)
γ
(
δ˜c − (U∗c )TMc(U∗c )
)
= 0, (2.36b)
γ ≥ 0, (2.36c)
(U∗c )
TMc(U
∗
c ) ≤ δ˜c, (2.36d)
where the gradient ∇ is with respect to Ua.
Case (i): Suppose (U∗c )TMc(U∗c ) < δ˜c. Then γ = 0 should hold true to ensure the com-
plementarity slackness condition (2.36b). Using these observations in the KKT conditions
we now have ∇f(U∗c ) = 0. Further, since, f(Ua) is a convex function of Ua, by evaluating
the second derivative of f(Ua) at U∗c , it can be easily seen that the obtained U∗c results in
minimum value of (P.2) rather than the maximum.Thus, for any U∗c of (P.2), the condition
(U∗c )TMc(U∗c ) < δ˜c cannot hold true.
Case (ii): Suppose (U∗c )TMc(U∗c ) = δ˜c. Then the KKT conditions can be simplified as:
∇
(
f(U∗c )− γ(U∗c )TMc(U∗c )
)
= 0,
(U∗c )
TMc(U
∗
c ) = δ˜c.
The result follows by evaluating the derivative on the left hand side of the first equality. 
Proof of Lemma 10: By substituting x(0) = 0 in (2.21a), we note that any optimal attack
U∗c is of the form kν, where ν is the generalized eigenvector of the pair (BTaB,Mc) [18], and
the scalar k =
√
δ˜c/νTMcν is obtained from (2.21b). Let Jc be the optimal cost associated
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with an attack of the form U∗c = kν. Then,
Jc = (kν)
TBTaBa(kν) = γ(kν)TMc(kν) = γδ˜c,
where the first equality follows from the fact that the objective function
∑T
k=1 x
T(k)x(k)
in (P.2) can be expressed as (U∗c )TBTaBa(U∗c ), and the second equality follows from (2.21a).
Since ν is a generalized eigenvector of the pair (BTaB,Mc), it follows that γ is the eigenvalue
corresponding to ν and hence, Jc is maximized when γ is maximum, which is obtained for
v = v?. The result follows since, γ = ρmax, for v = v
?. 
Proposition 13 Let Oi F (u)i be the observability and impulse response matrices defined in
(2.6). Define the matrices Oc,i =
[
(Cc,iA)
T · · · (Cc,iAT )T]T and Cc,i = [0 · · · Ci · · · 0],
and the following left null spaces:
NLi =
{
z : zT
[
Oi F (u)i
]
= 0T
}
,NLc,i =
{
z : zTOc,i = 0T
}
, and NLc =
N⋃
i=1
NLc,i. (2.37)
Then, NLi ⊆ NLc,i ⊆ NLc , for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let i = 1. By definition, the set inclusion NLc,1 ⊆ NLc is
trivial. For the other inclusion, consider the system defined in (2.3) without the attack and
noise, i.e., x(k + 1) = Ax(k). Let x(k) =
[
xT1 (k) u
T
1 (k)
]T
, where x1(k) and u1(k) are the
state and the interconnection signal of Subsystem 1. Also, let
A =
A11 B1
B˜1 A˜11
 . (2.38)
Notice that, x(k + 1) = Ax(k) can be decomposed as
x1(k + 1) = A11x1(k) +B1u1(k),
u1(k + 1) = A˜11u1(k) + B˜1x1(k).
(2.39)
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By letting C˜1 =
[
C1A11 C1B1
]
and recursively expanding x1(k) using (2.39), we have
Cc,1A
kx(0) =
[
C1 0
]
AAk−1x(0) = C˜1Ak−1x(0)
= C˜1
x1(k − 1)
u1(k − 1)
 = C˜1
Ak−111 x1(0) +
∑k−2
j=0 A
k−2−j
11 B1u1(j)
u1(k − 1)

= C1A
k
11x1(0) +
k−1∑
j=0
C1A
k−1−j
11 B1u1(j), (2.40)
where the second, third, and fourth equalities follows from (2.38), system x(k+1) = Ax(k),
and (2.39), respectively. By recalling that Oc,1x(0) =
[
(Cc,1A)
T · · · (Cc,1AT )T]T x(0), it
follows from (2.40) that
Oc,1x(0) = O1x1(0) + F (u)1
[
uT1 (0) · · · uT1 (T − 1)
]T
.
Let z be any vector such that zT
[
O1 F (u)1
]
= 0T. Then, z also satisfies zTOc,1 = 0T.
Thus, NL1 ⊆ NLc,1.
Lemma 14 (Upper bound on PDd ) Let pi and λi be defined as in (2.14), and τi be
defined as in (2.11). Let psum =
∑N
i=1 pi, λsum =
∑N
i=1 λi, and τmin = min
1≤i≤N
τi. Then,
PDd ≤ Pr [Sd > τmin]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,PDd
, where Sd ∼ χ2(psum, λsum).
Proof. Consider the following events:
Vi =
{
Y˜ Ti Σ
−1
i Y˜i ≥ τi
}
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and
V =
{
N∑
i=1
Y˜ Ti Σ
−1
i Y˜i ≥ τmin
}
,
where the event Vi is associated with the i−th local detector’s threshold test. From the
definition of the above events, it is easy to note that
⋃N
i=1 Vi ⊆ V. By the monotonicity of
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the probability measures, it follows that
PDd , Pr
[
N⋃
i=1
Vi |H1
]
≤ Pr [V |H1] .
From the reproducibility property of the noncentral chi-squared distribution [36], it follows
that
∑N
i=1 Y˜
T
i Σ
−1
i Y˜i equals Sd in distribution and hence, Pr[V|H1] = Pr[Sd > τmin].
Lemma 15 (Exponential bounds on the tails of χ2(p, λ)) Let Y ∼ χ2(p, λ), µ = p+λ,
σ =
√
2(p+ 2λ). For all x > 0,
Pr
[
Y ≥ µ+ σ
√
2x+ 2x
]
≤ exp(−x) (2.41a)
Pr
[
Y ≤ µ− σ
√
2x
]
≤ exp(−x) (2.41b)
Proof. See [6].
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Chapter 3
A Probabilistic Approach to
Design Switching Attacks against
Interconnected Systems
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study a security problem for interconnected systems, where the
objective of the attacker is to compromise the performance of the system by tampering with
the individual subsystems, while maintaining undetectability. In particular, we develop a
probabilistic rule to randomly select an attacked subsystem over time, and optimize over
the switching probabilities to maximize degradation and maintain undetectability from a
centralized detector. Overall, our results show that the ability to selectively compromise
different parts of a system over time greatly increases the severity of the attacks, thereby
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motivating the development of advanced detection schemes for interconnected system [2].
Main Contributions: This work features three main contributions. First, we develop an
attack model which randomly, through some pre-assigned probabilistic rule, compromise a
subsystem. Second, we characterize the detection probability of a centralized detector, with
respect to these attacks, and, derive upper bounds on the detection probabilities, both in
the finite and asymptotic cases. Third, we formulate and numerically solve an optimization
problem for computing optimal probabilistic rules with constraints on the detection prob-
ability. Finally, we demonstrate the superiority of using our optimal probabilistic strategy
against attacking fixed subsystem strategy on a real time example.
Related Work: In the last few years, with security emerging as a major concern for real
time dynamical systems, different attack models and possible remedial frameworks have
been studied by researchers to a great extent [49, 77, 76, 28, 61, 56]. Although, these works
provide deep insights into the attackers capabilities in compromising systems, several of
these works mainly restrict their attention to the attacks that target fixed subparts or the
overall system. Thereby undermining the vulnerabilities posed by the interconnected sys-
tems, at various subsystem and interconnection levels. However, only recently, researchers
started to study attack models in the context of interconnected systems, of which, the
switching attack locations model have received considerable attention. A few notable works
in this direction are as follows: Exploiting the sparsity structure in deterministic systems,
authors in [45] proposed dynamic decoders to estimate the initial state accurately. Instead,
for the stochastic systems, several authors proposed robust state estimation techniques
exploiting the tools from framework hidden mode switching systems and hidden Markov
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models [91, 39, 72]. Using the variable structure systems theory, authors in [47] demon-
strated switching attacks that can disrupt operation of power grid within a short period
of time. Instead, authors in [25] considered game-theoretic approach based power system
stabilizers to counter attack switching attacks in smart grids. Finally, authors in [88, 2]
studied the detrimental effects of switching and coordinated type of integrity attacks in
general cyber-physical systems.
3.2 Problem setup and preliminary notions
3.2.1 Nominal system model
We consider an interconnected system composed of N interacting subsystems
whose dynamics are as follows:
xi(k + 1) = Aiixi(k) +
N∑
j 6=i
Aijxj(k) + wi(k),
yi(k) = Cixi(k) + vi(k),
(3.1)
where xi ∈ Rni and yi ∈ Rmi is the state and measurements of the i-th subsystem, and
wi ∼Wi, vi ∼ N (0, Vi) are the process and measurement noise affecting the i-th subsystem
dynamics. Let n =
∑N
i=1 ni and m =
∑N
i=1mi. In the vector form, the dynamics read as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + w(k),
y(k) = Cx(k) + v(k),
(3.2)
where the state x, measurements y, and the noise vectors w and v of the interconnected
system are given by x =
[
xT1 . . . x
T
N
]T
, y =
[
yT1 . . . y
T
N
]T
, w =
[
wT1 . . . w
T
N
]T
∈
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Rn, and v =
[
vT1 . . . v
T
N
]T
∈ Rm. Further, the dynamical matrices A and C are given by
A =

A11 · · · A1N
...
. . .
...
AN1 · · · ANN
 and C =

C1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · CN
 ,
respectively. The initial state x(0) ∼ N (0,Σ0), the noises w ∼ N (0,W ) and v ∼ N (0, V ) are
uncorrelated, for all k ∈ N, where the noise covariance matrices areW , blkdiag (W1, · · · ,WN )
and V , blkdiag (V1, · · · , VN ).
We assume that (3.2) is operating in steady state and, we allow for the presence
of attackers that compromise the dynamics of the subsystems, and we model such attacks
as exogenous unknown inputs (see Section 3.2.2). We task an interconnected system with a
detector whose role is to trigger an alarm, based on the innovations signals generated by a
Kalman filter. Under the assumption that (C,A) is observable and (A,W ) is controllable,
a steady Kalman filter employs the following recursion:
x̂(k) = Ax̂(k − 1) +Kzk,
z(k) = y(k)− CAx̂(k − 1),
(3.3)
where x̂(k) , E[x(k)|y(0), . . . , y(k)] is the MMSE estimate of the state x(k), and the ma-
trices K , PCT [CPCT +V ]−1 and P , A(I −KC)PAT +W are the steady state Kalman
gain and the error covariance matrix, respectively. Further, the innovations z(k) ∼ N (0,Σ)
forms an i.i.d sequence with covariance Σ , CPCT + V .
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3.2.2 Objectives of attacker and attacked system model
We assume that the main objective of an attacker is to inject malicious inputs into
the system (3.2) with the following objectives:
1. at any given time, an attacker selects a subsystem, with a probabilistic rule, to inject
a malicious inputs and,
2. the rule used in (i) should maximize the state deviation of (3.2) from the origin, and,
should result in minimum detection probability.
Our motivation to consider this kind of objective stems from the following reasoning: often
in practice, attackers need to compromise systems with limited amount of resources and,
ingenuous attackers might look for some clever mechanisms to tamper systems such that
the degradation of system performance is worse even with the limited resources.
Let {ak}∞k=0 be a scalar valued i.i.d stochastic process, where ak takes value in
the finite set {1, . . . , N}, at every time k ∈ N, with probability P[ak = i] , pi, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, such that ∑Ni=1 pi = 1. Let p , [p1, . . . , pN ]T, and note that p denotes the
probabilities of selecting subsystems. Thus, by specifying p, the attack process {ak}∞k=0,
realizes a subsystem index, for any given time k. Let δi(ak) be a indicator random variable
of ak, i.e., δi(ak) = 1 if ak = 1, else δi(ak) = 0 otherwise. Let δ(ak) , [δ1(ak), . . . , δN (ak)]T.
Then, the attacked system dynamics can be modeled as
xe(k + 1) = Axe(k) + w(k) + Π(k)δ(ak),
ye(k) = Cxe(k) + v(k) + Ψ(k)δ(ak),
(3.4)
where, xe(k) and ye(k) denote the state and the measurement of the system under attack.
The attack matrices are Π , blkdiag (Π1u1, . . . ,ΠNuN ) and Ψ , blkdiag (Ψ1u˜1, . . . ,ΨN u˜N ),
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respectively, where Πiui(k) and Ψiu˜(k) are the malicious inputs that an attacker wants to
inject into the i−th subsystem at time k. Further, we assume that the process {ak}∞k=0 is
independent of w(k) and v(k). Thus it follows that the random variables δ(ak), w(k), and
v(k) are mutually independent, for all k ∈ N. Let PD(k) be the detection probability of a
detector. Then, the attacker’s objective can be casted as a following optimization problem:
(P.1) arg max
p
E
[
T−1∑
k=0
xe(k + 1)Txe(k + 1)
]
,
subject to p ≥ 0, (3.5)
1Tp = 1, and (3.6)
PD(k) ≤ ζ ∀k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, (3.7)
where the expectation E[·] is taken over the noise variables and the process {ak}T−1k=0 . We
make the following assumption for an attacker to design an optimal probabilistic rule.
Assumption 16 The attacker has complete information about the matrices of the system
(3.2) and of the Kalman filter (3.3).
3.2.3 Relation between nominal and attacked system
In this section we characterize the bias accumulated in the interconnected system
dynamics (3.2) and the Kalman filter dynamics (3.3) due to the attacks. Let γ(k) and β(k)
denote the bias in the state and the measurements of (3.2), respectively. Then, xe(k) =
x(k) + γ(k) and ye(k) = y(k) + β(k), where
γ(k + 1) = Aγ(k) + Π(k)δ(ak),
β(k) = Cγ(k) + Ψ(k)δ(ak).
(3.8)
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To compute the bias in the state estimate and innovations, we consider the follow-
ing filter under attacks
x̂e(k) = Ax̂e(k − 1) +Kze(k),
ze(k) = ye(k)− CAx̂e(k − 1),
(3.9)
where x̂ek and z
e
k are analogous to the state estimate and the innovations defined in (3.3).
Let x̂e(k) = x̂(k) +α(k+ 1) and ze(k) = z(k) + (k). Then the biases α(k) and (k) can be
obtained from the following linear system:
α(k + 1) = (I −KC)Aα(k) +Kβ(k),
(k) = C [γ(k)−Aα(k)] + Ψ(k)δ(ak),
(3.10)
Notice that in the absence of attacks, the bias (k) = 0, and ze(k) = z(k) for all
k ∈ N. Instead, in the presence of attacks, the bias (k) 6= 0 and ze(k) 6= z(k) (at least for
one k). Based on this observation, in the following section we develop a procedure that will
be employed by a detector to decide against the attacks.
3.3 Detection framework
Let H0 and H1 be the null and the alternative hypothesis corresponding to the
presence and absence of attacks, respectively. The attack detection problem can be casted
using the following hypothesis testing framework:
H0 (attack absent) :E [ze(k)] = 0,
H1 (attack present) :E [ze(k)] 6= 0.
We assume that the detector uses a chi-squared test statistic [54, 15], which is a
quadratic transformation of the innovations ze(k), to compare with a threshold and decide
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against the attacks. Formally, we have the following test procedure for all k ∈ N:
Λ(k) , ze(k)TΣ−1ze(k)
H1
≷
H0
τ, (3.11)
where τ is a suitable threshold. The false alarm probability (PF ) and the detection proba-
bility (PD) of the test (3.11) are defined in the following way:
PF (k) , P [Λ(k) ≥ τ |H0] and PD(k) , P [Λ(k) ≥ τ |H1] .
We assume that PF (k) is identical for all k ∈ N and, thus we omit its dependence on
time and refer to it as PF . Now, by recalling that under the null hypothesis H0 the bias
(k) = 0, we have ze(k) ∼ N (0,Σ). It follows that Λ(k) ∼ χ2(m), where m is the degrees
of freedom. Further, we assume that PF is predetermined and the threshold τ is computed
by the inverse CDF of χ2(m).
3.3.1 Characterization of the detection probability
Notice that the detector cannot compute the detection probability PD(k), as it
does not know the bias (k) accumulated in the innovations ze(k). Although, this is a limi-
tation of the detector, it is not very beneficial to an attacker either, since, if the magnitude
of attack input is large, larger is the bias (k), greater the test statistic Λ(k), and hence
easier for the attack to satisfy (3.11). Instead, in order to inject attacks that can evade the
detector, i.e., bypass the threshold test (3.11), the attacker needs to know PD(k). In this
section we derive an expression for PD(k), which helps attacker decide what type of attacks
to be casted on the interconnected system. We now state a proposition that expresses the
bias (k) in terms of attack inputs until time k, for all k ∈ N.
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Proposition 17 Let A = A (I −KC) and B(k) = Π(k)−AKΨ(k). Then
(k) =
[
CAk−1B(0) . . . CB(k − 1) Ψ(k)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Ek

δ(a0)
...
δ(ak)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
,δ(a0:k)
. (3.12)
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now introduce the following notation that will be useful for characterizing
detection probability PD(k). Consider the truncation {aj}kj=0 of the actual attack process
{aj}∞j=0. Let Sk be the set of all possible realizations of {aj}kj=0, and pik be an element of
Sk, where the components of pik can be enumerated as [pi0k, pi1k . . . , pikk ]. With slight abuse of
notation we define δ(pik) , [δ1(pi0k)T, . . . , δN (pikk)T]T. To avoid confusion, we emphasize that
δ(a0:k) is a random vector but δ(pik) is a deterministic (realized) vector.
Lemma 18 (Detection probability) The detection probability of the test statistic (3.11)
is given by
PD(k) =
∑
pik∈Sk
Q(τ ;m,λ(pik))ppi0k
ppi1k
· · · ppikk , (3.13)
where Q(τ ; r, λ(pik)) is the complementary CDF of χ
2(τ, λ(pik)), λ(pik) , δ˜(pik)TETk Σ−1Ekδ˜(pik).
Proof. See the Appendix.
For the attacks that randomly select a subsystem, Lemma 18, states that the
PD(k) is a weighted sum of detection probability, i.e., Q(τ ;m,λ(pik)), associated with all
possible ways of selecting the locations. Moreover, for a given k, these weights are nothing
but the binomial coefficients of the expansion (p1 + . . . + pN )
k. Finally, notice that the
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expression (3.13) depends on the matrices of the interconnected system and the KF through
the impulse response Ek in (3.12) of λ(pik) = δ˜(pik)TETk Σ−1Ekδ˜(pik). Hence, the following
assumption ensures that an attacker has the capability to compute PD(k) for k ∈ N.
3.3.2 Upper bound on the detection probability
Although the formula of PD(k) we obtained in Lemma 18 is exact, the number
of summands in (3.13) increases exponentially with time k. Hence, for practical purposes,
computing the detection probability using (3.13) is not efficient. In this section we provide
an upper bound on PD(k) using Markov’s inequality. We now define the following matrices
that will be helpful in expressing our bound compactly:
ETk Σ−1Ek ,

Lk(0, 0) Lk(0, 1) · · · Lk(0, k)
Lk(1, 0) Lk(1, 1) · · · Lk(1, k)
...
...
. . .
...
Lk(k, 0) Lk(k, 1) . . . Lk(k, k)

, (3.14)
where Lk(i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ k is obtained by performing block wise multiplication of matrices
in ETk with those in Σ−1Ek. Moreover, this construction results in Lk(i, j) = Lk(j, i)T, for
all i, j. Further, define Lk and L̂k as
Lk ,
∑
i=j
Lk(i, j) and L̂k ,
∑
i 6=j
Lk(i, j), (3.15)
respectively. Further, Lk is a positive semi definite matrix, while L̂k is a symmetric matrix.
Lemma 19 (Upper bound of the detection probability) Let p , [p1, p2, . . . , pN ]T be
the vector of probabilities with pi denoting the probability of attacking an i−th subsystem,
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∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then, for all k ∈ N, it holds that
PD(k) ≤ m+ diag(Lk)
Tp+ pTL̂kp
τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
D
(k)
. (3.16)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that, unlike the expression in (3.13), the upper bound P
D
(k) is a quadratic
expression in the probability vector p. Further, P
D
(k) dose not depend on the Q function,
which is an infinite series. Rather it depends directly on the impulse response (3.12) through
the matrices Lk and L̂k. Finally, we note that the bound (3.16) becomes loose if the
threshold τ is not sufficiently large, or equivalently, for the higher values of PF .
3.3.3 Asymptotic upper bound
In this section we aim to provide an asymptotic expression for the bound P
D
(k)
when k →∞. For this purpose, we assume that the attack matrices are constant for all the
times, i.e., Π(k) , Π and Ψ(k) , Ψ for all k ∈ N.
Lemma 20 (Asymptotic upper bound of the detection probability) Let P
D
(k) be
as in (3.16). Then,
P
D
∞ , lim
k→∞
PD(k) =
m+ diag(L∞)Tp+ pTL̂∞p
τ
.
where L∞ = BTOB + ΨTΣ−1Ψ, L̂∞ = BT [O −M]B − ΨΣ−1Ψ, B = Π − AKΨ, O ,∑∞
j=0(Aj)TCTΣ−1CAj, and M , (I −A)−TCTC(I −A)−1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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As PD(k) ≤ PD(k), for all k ∈ N, from the above Lemma we can observe that for
large k, the upper bound of detection probability is constant. Intuitively, what it means
is that, if the attacker is not detected during the transience period of the filter (3.3), since
the beginning of attacks, then it is unlikely for an attacker to be detected once the filter
(3.3) reaches the steady state. Finally, if the attack matrices Π and Ψ are chosen such
that the constraint (3.19), i.e., PD(k) ≤ ζ for k ∈ {0, . . . , T0 − 1}, where T is sufficiently
large, the Lemma 20 guarantees that PD(k) ≤ ζ, for all times k ∈ N. Thus, this type of
asymptotic analysis helps an attacker to carefully chose the attack matrices a priori that
yields minimum detection probability.
3.4 Design of an optimal probabilistic strategy
In this section we solve the optimization problem (P.1) described in Section 3.2
with the help of numerical optimization techniques. First, we rewrite the cost function
of (P.1) in such way that it depends explicitly on the variable p. Under Assumption ??,
consider the following impulse response matrices associated with the system (3.8):
HT−1 ,

Π 0 · · · 0
AΠ Π · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
AT−1Π AT−2Π . . . Π

and
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HTT−1HT−1 ,

G(0, 0) · · · G(0, T − 1)
...
. . .
...
G(T − 1, 0) . . . G(T − 1, T − 1)
 , (3.17)
and let
GT−1 ,
∑
i=j
G(i, j) and ĜT−1 ,
∑
i 6=j
G(i, j). (3.18)
By construction, GT−1 is a positive definite matrix, while ĜT−1 is a symmetric matrix. The
following proposition express the cost function of (P.1) in terms of GT−1 and ĜT−1.
Proposition 21 The cost function of (P.1) is equivalent to diag(GT−1)Tp+ pTĜT−1p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As PD(k) is inefficient for computational purposes we relax the constraint (3.7)
of (P.1) by replacing it with constraint on the upper bound P
D
(k). By incorporating
the aforementioned changes in (P.1) we now have the following quadratically constrained
quadratic programming type problem, whose solution yields a sub-optimal probabilistic
attack strategy, with respect to the original problem (P.1).
(P.2) arg max
p
diag(GT−1)Tp+ pTĜT−1p,
subject to 1Tp = 1, p ≥ 0
p ≥ 0,
diag(Lk)
Tp+ pTL̂kp ≤ τ ζ −m
∀k ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} (3.19)
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Notice that (P.2) is a non-convex optimization problem, since the matrices L̂k, for
all k ∈ 0, . . . , T − 1, and ĜT−1 are only symmetric matrices. Thus, the standard convex
optimization techniques/analysis cannot be applicable. Hence, to obtain a feasible solution
to the maximization problem (P.2) we use standard numerical solvers. We also note that
this optimal solution might not be a global maximum.
3.4.1 Numerical Example
We consider a chemical reactor consisting of two continuous stirred-tank reactors
[35]. The discretized system matrices, with sampling time Ts = 1, are given by
A11 =
0.2603 −0.1862
0.1862 0.2603
 , A12 =
−0.0188 −0.0230
0.0232 −0.00188
 ,
A21 =
−0.0215 −0.0266
0.0263 −0.0215
 , A12 =
−0.3120 0.2713
−0.2713 −0.3120
 .
We consider the state and measurement attack matrices as
Π = Ψ =
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1

T
.
Our results are illustrated in Fig. 3.1 and Fig. 3.2. For the probabilistic rule
p = [0.5, 0.5]T and PF = 0.01, in Fig. 3.1 we report the actual detection probability PD(k)
(3.13) and the upper bound PD(k), for a given system and Kalman filter. As discussed in
Section 3.3, we can see that the bound (3.16) converges to a constant when T increases. In
Fig. 3.2 we report the values of the cost function (P.2) for the optimal probabilistic rule
p = p∗ and the fixed location rule, i.e., the degenerate probability vectors p = [1, 0]T and
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Figure 3.1: This figure shows the detection probability as a function of time. The black solid
corresponds to the detection probability evaluated using (3.13). The dashed orange line is
obtained using the upper bound (3.16). For the PF = 0.01, degrees of freedom m = 4, and
the attack matrices Π and Ψ, we notice that although there is an initial transience, due to
the dynamics of Kalman filter, as discussed in Section 3.3, the actual value and the bound
converges to a constant.
p = [0, 1]T, respectively. From Fig. 3.2 and as expected, the optimal rule results in higher
degradation of the system performance. This work shows that the use of probabilistic rule
for switching location attacks benefits attacker, as opposed to attacking fixed locations. As
seen in the formulation of (P.2), one can see that, the optimal probabilistic rule depends
on the subsystem dynamics, interconnection signals, and the choice of attack matrices. We
leave these characterizations for our future research.
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Figure 3.2: This figure shows the performance degradation of interconnected systems, eval-
uated by the cost function value of (P.2), for various subsystem selecting rules. The blue
solid line correspond to the cost function associated with optimal probabilistic rule, that
was obtained by solving (P.2) using numerical solver. The dashed orange (resp. dotted
green) is obtained by using fixed attack locations. As expected the cost function values
for all the rules increase with time horizon. In particular, the optimal probabilistic rule
resulted in worst performance degradation than the rest.
3.5 Summary
This paper studies a security problem for interconnected systems, where the at-
tacker objective is to randomly compromise subsystems, such that the performance degrada-
tion of interconnected system is maximum. We developed a probabilistic rule for attacking
subsystems and characterized the bias accumulated in the system due to these attacks. We
also characterized the detection probability of a centralized detector, and formulated an
optimization problem to find an optimum probabilistic rule that maximizes system degra-
dation, while maintaining minimum detection probability.
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3.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 17: Let θ(k) , γ(k)−Aα(k), then from (3.8) and (3.10) it follows that
θ(k + 1) = γ(k + 1)−Aα(k + 1)
= Aγ(k) + Π(k)δ(ak)−A(I −KC)Aα(k)−AKβ(k)
= A [γ(k)−Aα(k)]−AKC [γ(k)−Aα(k)] + Π(k)u(k)−AKΨ(k)u(k)
= A (I −KC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,A
θ(k) + [Π(k)−AKΨ(k)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
,B(k)
δ(ak)
Now, from (3.10), (k) can be easily computed by using the following linear system
θ(k + 1) = Aθ(k) + B(k)δ(ak)
(k) = Cθ(k) + Ψ(k)δ(ak)
The result follows by recursively expanding θ(k) and observing that θ(0) = 0, since γ(0) =
0 and α(0) = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 18: For any k ∈ N, let I{Λ(k)≥τ} be the indicator function of the event
{Λ(k) ≥ τ}. Then, by using the iterated expectations formula we have
PD(k) = P [Λ(k) > τ |H1] = E
[
I{Λ(k)≥τ}|H1
]
= E
[
E
[
I{Λ(k)≥τ} |H1, δ(a0:k)
] |H1] , (3.20)
where the outer expectation is with respect to the truncated process a0:k , {aj}kj=0. Let
δ˜(pik) be a realization of δ(a0:k), where pik = [pi
0
k, . . . , pi
k
k ]
T. Then, under the hypothesis H1,
we note that (k) = Ekδ˜(pik) is a deterministic quantity and further it follows that
ze(k)|
H1,δ(a0:k)=δ˜(pik)
∼ N ((k),Σ).
Now, from the definition of noncentral chi-squared distribution, we also have
Λ(k) |
H1,δ(a0:k)=δ˜(pik)
∼ χ2(m,λ(pik)),
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Thus, from the above characterizations and the fact that conditional expectation of an
indicator function is equal to the conditional probability, we conclude that
E
[
I{Λ(k)≥τ} |H1, δ(a0:k) = δ˜(pik)
]
= Q(τ ;m,λ(pik)),
Substituting above expression in (3.20), and taking the expectation over all realizations of
a0:k yields us the following:
PD(k) =
∑
pik∈Sk
Q(τ ;m,λ(pik))P(a0:k = pik) (3.21)
Since, the attack process {ak}∞k=0 is i.i.d it follows that P(a0:k = pik) =
∏k
j=0 P
(
aj = pi
j
k
)
=∏k
j=0 ppijk
. By substituting above expression in (3.21) the statement of Lemma follows. 
Proof of Lemma 19: From the definition of PD(k) we have
PD(k) = P[(ze(k))TΣ−1ze(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ(k)
≥ τ |H1].
As Λ(k) ≥ 0, from Markov’s inequality it follows that
P[(ze(k))TΣ−1ze(k) ≥ τ |H1] ≤
E
[
(ze(k))TΣ−1ze(k)|H1
]
τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
P
D
(k)
.
Notice that under hypothesis H1, z
e(k) = z(k) + (k) and, from Proposition 17, (k) =
Ekδ(a0:k) 6= 0. As the process {ak}∞k=0 is independent of noise random variables affecting
the system dynamics, it also follows that z(k) and δ(a0:k) are independent, and we have
E
[
(ze(k))TΣ−1ze(k)
]
= E[z(k)TΣ−1z(k) + 2z(k)TΣ−1(k) + (k)TΣ−1(k)]
(a)
= E[z(k)TΣ−1z(k) + (k)TΣ−1(k)], (3.22)
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where (a) follows because z(k) is independent of (k) and E[z(k)] = 0. Now, consider,
E[z(k)TΣ−1z(k)] = Tr
(
E[z(k)TΣ−1z(k)
)
= Tr
(
Σ−1E[z(k)z(k)T]
)
= Tr
(
Σ−1Σ
)
= m (3.23)
where the last equality follows because the innovations z(k) and the measurements y(k) has
the same dimension. Before simplifying the second term of (3.22) we note that
E
[
δa0:kδ
T
a0:k
]
=

E[δ(a0)δ(a0)T] . . . E[δ(a0)δ(ak)T]
...
. . .
...
E[δ(ak)δ(a0)T] . . . E[δ(ak)δ(ak)T]
 =

diag(p) ppT . . . ppT
ppT diag(p) . . . ppT
...
...
. . .
...
ppT ppT . . . diag(p)

,
(3.24)
where the second equality follows because the process {ak}∞k=0 is i.i.d and E[δ(ak)] = p, for
all k ∈ N. Further, p = [p1, . . . , pN ]T and, with slight abuse of notation, we denote diag(p)
as the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements as components of p. Consider the following:
E[(k)TΣ−1(k)] = Tr
(
Σ−1E[(k)(k)T]
)
= Tr
(
Σ−1E[Ekδ(a0:k)δ(a0:k)TETk ]
)
= Tr
(
ETk Σ−1EkE[δa0:kδTa0:k ]
)
By invoking (3.14) and (3.24) in the above expression, and, followed by block multiplication
of entries in ETk Σ−1Ek and E[δa0:kδTa0:k ] we can see that
E[(k)TΣ−1(k)] = Tr
(
Lkdiag(p)
)
+ Tr
(
L̂kpp
T
)
= pTdiag(Lk) + p
TL̂kp (3.25)
By substituting (3.23) and (3.25) in PD(k), the statement of Lemma follows. 
Proof of Lemma 20: From (3.16) we note the following:
lim
k→∞
P
D
(k) =
m+ lim
k→∞
diag(Lk)
Tp+ lim
k→∞
pTL̂kp
τ
(3.26)
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Under Assumption ?? and from (3.15) it follows that
Lk =
k−1∑
j=0
B(j)T(Aj)TCTΣ−1CAjB(j) + Ψ(k)TΣ−1Ψ(k),
=
k−1∑
j=0
BT(Aj)TCTΣ−1CAjB + ΨTΣ−1Ψ,
Since A = A(I −KC) is stable, we note that lim
k→∞
∑k−1
j=0(Aj)TCTΣ−1CAj exists. Thus
L∞ , lim
k→∞
Lk = BTOB + ΨTΣ−1Ψ (3.27)
Now, let Ek ,
∑k−1
j=0 CAjB and note that lim
k→∞
Ek = lim
k→∞
∑k−1
j=0 CAjB = C(I − A)−1B,
where the last equality because A is a stable matrix. Moreover, a straightforward compu-
tation results in L̂(k) = ETk Ek − Lk. By taking limits on both sides we have
L∞ , lim
k→∞
L̂k = lim
k→∞
(
ETk Ek − Lk
)
= BT (I −A)−TCTC(I −A)−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
,M
B − L∞ = BT [O −M]B −ΨΣ−1Ψ (3.28)
Now, by substituting (3.27), and (3.28) in (3.26) it follows that
P
D
∞ , lim
k→∞
P
D
(k) =
m+ diag(L∞)Tp+ pTL̂∞p
τ
. 
Proof of Proposition 21: Recall that xe(k) = x(k)+γ(k), E[x(0)] = 0 and x(k) is independent
of γ(k), for all k ∈ N. Hence,
E
[
T−1∑
k=0
xe(k + 1)xe(k + 1)
]
=
T−1∑
k=0
E [x(k + 1)x(k + 1)] + E [γ(k + 1)γ(k + 1)]
As the first term does not depend on the optimization variable p, for purpose of optimization,
we can treat it as a constant. Instead, from (3.8) and (3.17) it follows that
T−1∑
k=0
γ(k + 1)Tγ(k + 1) = δ(a0:T−1)THTT−1HT−1δ(a0:T−1)
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Now, by taking the expectation on both sides of the above equation and following the same
procedure as we did in Proof of Lemma 19 (for analyzing E[(k)TΣ−1(k)]), the statement
of Proposition follows. 
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Chapter 4
Network Theoretic Analysis of
Maximum a Posteriori Detectors
for Optimal Sensor Placement
In this chapter we consider a sensor placement problem using the input-output
properties of the network dynamics [67, 89, 68, 51]. In contrast to the existing works,
which primarily focused on either estimating or reconstructing the network dynamics, in
this work, we formulate the placement problem from a detection theoretic view point. In
particular, we are concerned with detecting statistical abnormalities in a local stochastic
input to a network, using a detector that only relies on the remote time-course measurements
of the network dynamics. The basic idea is that the network topological structure enforce
relationships between signals at different locations in the network, which means that changes
to the dynamics at one location can potentially be detected using measurement signatures at
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other locations in the network. Our analysis leads to the interesting results that, depending
on the network weights and structure, and the intensity of sensor noise, the detection
performance may improve as the graphical distance between the input nodes and the sensors
location increases. In fact, our results (i) inform the optimal positioning of sensors for the
detection of failure of system components or malicious tampering modeled by unknown
stochastic inputs, (ii) allow the detection of unexpected modification of the system structure,
because such changes would modify the original detection profile, and (iii) provide network
design guidelines to facilitate or prevent measurability of certain network signals.
Main Contributions: We briefly summarize our main contributions as follows. First, we
consider a binary hypothesis testing problem for a discrete time Gaussian process driving
the linear network dynamics through certain network nodes. We primarily consider the
scenario where hypothesis on either the mean or the covariance of the input process must be
detected using the measurements (possibly corrupted with white Gaussian noise) collected
from nodes (referred as to output nodes) that are at least at a specified distance apart from
the input nodes. We characterize the maximum a posteriori (MAP) detector, and quantify
its performance as a function of input-output transfer function matrix gain of the network
system. These results are significant in their own rights. In fact, in cyber-physical security
literature, there are only limited works related to detecting changes in the covariance of the
input, modeled as attacks, and our results contributes to this area as well.
Second, we study the MAP detector’s performance as a function of the sensors
locations. In particular, in the absence of noise, regardless of the network structure and
edge weights, we show that the performance of the detector associated with a set of sensors
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forming a cut of the network (nodes on the cut shall be referred as to cutset nodes) is as
good as the performance obtained by measuring all nodes of the subnetwork identified by
the cut and not containing the nodes affected by the input nodes (referred as partitioned set
nodes). Conversely, in the presence of noise, depending upon the internal transfer function
matrix gain between the cutset nodes and the partitioned nodes, we show that the detection
performance of sensors on the cutset nodes may be better or worse than those of sensors
on the partitioned nodes. Finally, we demonstrate our theoretical findings on Toeplitz line
networks and some illustrative numerical examples.
Related Work: As the optimal sensor placement problem belongs to the class of combina-
torial optimization problem, several research communities focused on developing heuristic
algorithms and convex relaxation methods [86, 37, 38, 57, 20]. The computational complex-
ity of selecting minimum input and output sets for achieving controllability and observability
has been addressed by the authors in [93, 60, 63], and the authors in [60, 81] showed that
these are NP-hard problems. A significant amount of work has also been devoted to the
observability of linear systems from a graph theoretic view point [17, 12, 50]. In recent
years, there is also an incipient research effort to optimize some useful Grammian based
metrics in order to ensure the controllability (and dually, observability) [75, 62, 96, 82].
Finally, we also notice the current advancements in partial control of network’s dynamics,
which are refereed under the names as target controllability or reachability [85, 82].
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4.1 Preliminaries and problem setup
Consider a network represented by the digraph G := (V, E), where V := {1, . . . , n}
and E ⊆ V × V are the node and edge sets. Let gij ∈ R be the weight assigned to the
edge (i, j) ∈ E , and define the weighted adjacency matrix of G as G := [gij ], where gij = 0
whenever (i, j) /∈ E . Let K := {k1, . . . , kr} ⊆ V be the set of input nodes, which receive r
inputs. Let w(i, j) denote a path on G from node i to j, and let |w(i, j)| be the number of
edges of w(i, j). Define the distance between input node set K and a set of nodes S ⊆ V as
dist(K,S) := min{|w(i, j)| : i ∈ K, j ∈ S}. We associate to each node i a state xi ∈ R, and
let the network evolve with discrete linear dynamics
x[k + 1] = Gx[k] + Πw[k], (4.1)
where x = [x1 · · ·xn]T ∈ Rn contains the states of the nodes at time k ∈ N, x[0] ∼ N (0,Σ0)
is the initial state, and w[k] ∈ Rr is the input vector. The input matrix Π = [ek1 , . . . , ekr ]
indicates the location of the input nodes. Let the input w[k] be governed by one of the
following two competing statistical hypotheses:
H1 : w[k]
i.i.d∼ N (µ1,Σ1) , k = 0, 1, . . . , N,
H2 : w[k]
i.i.d∼ N (µ2,Σ2) , k = 0, 1, . . . , N,
(4.2)
where the moments µi ∈ Rr and Σi ∈ Rr×r( 0), i ∈ {1, 2}, are completely known. In other
words, the competing hypotheses are simple. However, the true hypothesis is assumed to be
unknown. We are concerned with detecting the true hypothesis on the input signal, using
measurements from the sensors that are not collocated with the input nodes.
We assume that the nodes J := {j1, . . . , jm} ⊆ V are accessible for sensor place-
ment (one sensor for each node), if dist(K,J ) ≥ d, where d ∈ N. We refer to J as the
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sensor set. The output of these sensors is given by
yJ [k] = Cx[k] + v[k], (4.3)
where C = [ej1 , . . . , ejm ]
T and v[k] ∼ N (0, σ2vI). Let the process {x[0],w[0],v[0],w[1],v[1], . . .}
be uncorrelated. To detect the true hypothesis, we task sensors with a detector, which maps
the following time aggregated measurements
YTJ =
[
yTJ [1] y
T
J [2] · · ·yTJ [N ]
]
, (4.4)
to a detected hypothesis Ĥ. We will consider the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP)
detector, which is given by the following decision rule:
Pr({H2 is true}|YJ )
Ĥ=H2
≷
Ĥ=H1
Pr({H1 is true}|YJ ). (4.5)
For a predetermined set of input nodes K, the focus of our analysis is to characterize the
performance of the detector (4.5), in terms of the network’s adjacency matrix G. The
performance of the detector (4.5) is measured by its error probability, which is given by
Pe(J ) =
∑
i∈{1,2}
Pr(Ĥ 6= Hi|{Hi is true})pii. (4.6)
where pii = Pr({Hi is true}) is the prior probability.
For any sensor set J that statisifes dist(K,J ) ≥ d, one expects that the MAP
detector’s performance (4.6) is maximum when dist(K,J ) = d. However, for certain net-
work configurations, studies have shown that the gain of transfer function, which is closely
related to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of a detector, is maximum when the input and
output nodes are farther apart [79]. Hence, it remains unclear whether the closeness of the
sensors to the input nodes improves the performance of the detector.
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3
2
8
7w1[k]
w2[k]
input nodes: {1, 2}
partitioned nodes: {8, 7}
cutset nodes: {4, 5, 6}
Figure 4.1: Illustration of network partitions induced by a node cutset.
In this paper, we show that the graphical proximity indeed modulate the MAP
detector’s performance, for certain classes of the detection problems (4.2). In particular,
we characterize networks for which the detection performance obtained when sensors are
located on a node cutset is better (or worse) than the performance obtained when sensors
are placed on nodes of the subnetwork induced by the node cutset that does not contain the
input nodes (precise statements are provided in Section 4.3). See Fig 4.1 for an illustration
of node cutset and the subnetwork (partitioned nodes) induced by it. Throughout the paper,
we will distinguish the performance of sensors with measurement noise σ2v = 0 and without
noise σ2v > 0. The essential reason, as we will show later, is that only in the presence of
noise, we have a scenario where the performance of a MAP detector associated with the
cutset nodes may be worse than that of the partitioned nodes. We end this section with an
example that shows the impact of noise on the detection performance.
Example 22 Let Hi : w[k] ∼ N (µi, σ2) and y[k] = αw[k]+v[k], where α is the tuning
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parameter and v(k)∼N (0, σ2v). For pii = 0.5, the MAP detector’s error probability, based
on N samples of y, is 0.5QN (0.5 η). Here η2 =N(µ1−µ2)2/(σ2 +α−2σ2v) denotes the SNR,
and QN (0.5 η) is decreasing in η. For σ2v = 0, the error probability does not depend on α,
and is lesser than the case where σ2 > 0. However, when σ2v > 0, QN (·) depends on α. In
particular, when α is small, QN (·) is high, and vice versa. Thus, in the presence of noise,
the error probability can be reduced by properly tuning α. 
Remark 23 (Non-testable hypotheses and zero dynamics) The hypothesis testing
framework considered in this paper may not applicable to the situations such as the system
(4.1) associated with the measurement model (4.3) has zero dynamics, i.e., YJ [k] = 0 for
non-zero input or, some components of the input gets canceled in the operation of Cx[k].
However, in the latter case, our framework can modified to analyze the input signals that
lies in the low dimensional subspace. 
4.2 Detection performance of the MAP detector
In this section, we derive the algebraic expressions of the MAP decision rules and
their error probabilities for two special cases of the hypotheses in (4.2). The first case is the
mean shift model, in which the covariance matrices in (4.2) are equal, but the mean vectors
are different. The second case is the covariance shift model in which the mean vectors in
(4.2) are equal, but the covariance matrices are different. For this latter case, we will rely
on the LD-MAP detector (see below) for deciding the hypothesis. The reason for working
with these models is twofold: (i) the error probability expressions are analytically tractable,
and (ii) these models are widely used for detection and classification problems that arise
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in practice [80, 70]. The probability expressions we derive in this section will be used for
the network analysis of the MAP detector’s performance (details in Section 4.3). Finally, it
should be noted that, although we deal with two detection frameworks, all our results will
be stated in common theorem environment, i.e., we don’t state our results for mean and
covariance shift models separately (for instance, see Lemma 27).
Definition 24 (Linear discriminant function-based MAP detector: LD-MAP) A
LD-MAP detector is as in (4.5) with YJ (4.4) replaced by the discriminant y = bTYJ ,
where the vector 1 b ∈ RmN is the maximizer of the information divergence criterion:
I=pi1E
[
ln
fH1(y)
fH2(y)
∣∣∣∣H1]+pi2E [ ln fH2(y)fH1(y)
∣∣∣∣H2] , (4.7)
where fHi(y) is the density of y given Hi and I > 0.
Remark 25 (Optimal discriminant vector) For any arbitrary vector b, the I-divergence
measure (4.7) indicates how well a LD-MAP detector is performing in deciding between H1
and H2. Thus by maximizing (4.7), we are finding an optimal detector among the class of
LD-MAP detectors parameterized by b [70]. 
We now state a lemma that provides us with the algebraic expressions of the MAP
detectors associated with the mean and covariance shift models.
Proposition 26 (Mean and covariance of YJ ) Let YJ and Hi be defined as in (4.4)
and (4.2), resp. Then,
µi,E[YJ |Hi]=F (1N ⊗ µi) and
Σi,Cov[YJ |Hi]=OΣ0OT + F (IN ⊗ Σi)FT + σ2vI,
(4.8)
1In the literature of pattern recognition and communications, b is commonly referred as to the Fisher’s
discriminant and optimal SINR beam former, respectively [24, 8].
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where, the observability and impulse response matrices are
O=

CG
CG2
...
CGN

and F=

CΠ 0 . . . 0
CGΠ CΠ . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
CGN−1Π CGN−2Π . . . CΠ

.
Lemma 27 (MAP detectors) Let pi1 and pi2 be non-zero priors, and define γ = ln(pi1/pi2).
Let YJ be as in (4.4), and let (µi,Σi) and (µi,Σi) be as in (4.2) and (4.8), resp.
1. The MAP detector associated with the mean shift model (Σ1 = Σ2 but µ1 6= µ2) is
given by:
(
2µT∆Σ
−1
c
)
YJ
Ĥ=H2
≷
Ĥ=H1
2γ + µT∆Σ
−1
c (µ1 + µ2) , (4.9)
where µ∆ = µ2 − µ1 and Σc , Σ1 = Σ1.
2. The LD-MAP detector associated with the covariance shift model (Σ1 6= Σ2 but µ1 =
µ2) is given by:
ln
(
d1
d2
)
− 2γ
Ĥ=H2
≷
Ĥ=H1
(y − bTµc)2
[
1
d2
− 1
d1
]
, (4.10)
where y = bTYJ , di = bTΣib, and µc , µ1 = µ2.
The detectors (4.9) and (4.10) are functions of the sufficient statistics 2µT∆Σ
−1
c YJ
and y − bTµc, respectively. This means that, given these statistics, other information in
YJ is not needed for deciding between H1 and H2. In order to characterize the error
probabilities of the detectors in Lemma 27, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 28 The LTI system (4.1) is stable. Further,
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1. for the mean shift model, limN→∞N‖µ2 − µ1‖2 = c, where 0 < c < ∞, and Gk = 0
for some k ∈ N, and
2. for the covariance shift model, Σ1  0 and Σ2 = 0.
Lemma 29 (Error probability: infinite horizon) Let pi1 = pi2 = 0.5 and x[0] = 0. Let
T (z) = C(zI −G)−1Π, where z /∈ spec(G). The error probability of the MAP detector (4.9)
and the LD-MAP detector (4.10) as N →∞ are
Pem(J )=0.5QN (0.5 η) and (4.11)
Pev(J )=0.5
[
1−Qχ2 (1, τ)
]
+ 0.5Qχ2 (1, τR) , (4.12)
respectively, where τ = lnR/(R− 1). The SNRs are
η2 = N µ˜T∆
(
[LTL+ σ2vI]
−1LTL
)
µ˜∆ and (4.13)
R = 1 + σ−2v ‖T (z)Σ
1
2
1 ‖2∞, (4.14)
where L = T (1)Σ
1
2
c and µ˜∆ = Σ
− 1
2
c [µ2 − µ1], and Σ
1
2
c and Σ
1
2
1 are the positive square roots
of Σc and Σ1, respectively.
The assumptions pii = 0.5 and x[0] = 0 are for the ease of presentation, and the
probability expressions can be easily adjusted to include other priors and initial conditions.
The assumption N‖µ2 − µ1‖2 → c ensures that Pem(J ) < 0.5. Instead, the assumption
Gk = 0 is to eliminate the remainder terms in the computation of η. We emphasize that
the only restriction on k is that it should be finite, but can be arbitrarily large. We now
state a corollary to the above lemma in which we do not assume Σ2 = 0 in the covariance
shift model (see Remark 32).
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Corollary 30 (SNRs: identical input statistics) Let Hi in (4.2) be w[k] ∼ N (µi1, σ2iD),
where µi and σ
2
i are scalars, and D > 0. For the covariance shift model let σ
2
1 > σ
2
2. Then,
η2s =
(
Nµ2∆
)
1T[σ2cL
TL+ σ2vI]
−1LTL1, (4.15)
Rs =
σ21‖T (z)D
1
2 ‖∞ + σ2v
σ22‖T (z)D
1
2 ‖∞ + σ2v
, (4.16)
where µc = µi, σc = σi, L = T (1)D
1
2 , and µ∆ = µ2 − µ1.
The error probabilities for the identical statistics case can be obtained by substi-
tuting ηs and Rs to η and R in (4.11) and (4.12), respectively. The effect of sensor noise
is also evident from the SNR expressions in the above corollary. In particular, by setting
σ2v = 0 in (4.15) and (4.16), the probabilities do not depend on the network matrix G.
Notice that the expressions of Pem(J ) and Pem(J ) in above lemma are valid even
when N is finite. However, in this case, η and R are complicated functions of the adjacency
matrix G. Instead, the elegance of SNRs in Lemma 29 and Corollary 30 is that they depend
on the adjacency matrix G through the well understood transfer matrix T (z). Thus, when
N → ∞, one can easily understand the impact of network structure on the detection
performance by analyzing T (z). By interpreting the quadratic function in η (or ηs) and
‖ · ||∞ in R (or Rs) as a measure of gain, one expects that higher gains results in minimum
error probabilities. This intuition is made precise in the following proposition:
Proposition 31 Pem(J ) and Pev(J ) are decreasing in η (or ηs) and R (or Rs), resp.
The above proposition also helps us to compare the performance of the MAP
detectors associated with different sensor sets. This fact will be exploited greatly in the
next section on network analysis of the MAP detector’s performance.
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Remark 32 (LD-MAP detector’s error probability for other covariance matrix
structures) We now comment on extending Pev(J ) (4.12) for including other covariance
matrices. The case Σ1 = 0 and Σ2 > 0 can be handled using the proof of Lemma 29. For
the scenario where neither of Σ1 or Σ2 is zero, if we have N < ∞ and λmax(Σ1Σ−12 ) >
λmin(Σ1Σ
−1
2 ), then Pev(J ) remains the same as in (4.12), with R = λmax(Σ1Σ−12 ). For
other cases we refer the reader to [70]. However, the main difficulty in analyzing any
of these error probabilities lies in the fact that resulting expressions of SNRs (R) are not
amenable to analysis. If one assumes Σ1 and Σ2 to be simultaneously diagonalizable, as is
the case with Corollary 30, an expression of R similar to (4.16) may be obtained. 
4.3 Network analysis of the MAP detector
In this section, we characterize networks for which the MAP detector’s performance
associated with the sensors that are close to the input nodes is better (or worse) than those
of sensors that are farther apart. We distinguish two separate cases when the sensors are
without noise (σ2v > 0) and with noise (σ
2
v = 0). To make the notion of closeness precise,
we introduce the notion of a node cutset.
Definition 33 (Node cutset) For the graph G = (V, E) with input nodes K, the nodes
Cd ⊆ V, with d > 1, form a node cutset if there exist a non empty source set S ⊆ V and a
partitioned set P ⊆ V such that V = S unionsq Cd unionsq P, where unionsq denotes the disjoint union, and
(i) K ⊆ S and dist(K, Cd) ≥ d, and
(ii) every path from S to P contains a node in Cd.
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The requirement (i) ensures that the node cutset is at least d edges away from the
input nodes. To illustrate Definition 33, consider the network in Fig 4.1. For the input nodes
K = {1, 2}, the nodes C1 = {4, 5, 6} forms a node cutset. However, the nodes {5, 6, 7} ceases
to form a node cutset, since they failed to satisfy requirement (ii) in the above definition.
Assumption 34 Given a graph G, the input node set K and the distance d is predetermined.
We are now ready to state our results on network theoretic characterization of the
MAP detectors. It should be noted that, if a result holds true for the general detection
problem (4.2), we do not state the analogous result for the mean and covariance shift models.
We begin with the case of noiseless measurements (σ2v = 0).
Theorem 35 (Performance of sensors on the node cutset vs the partitioned set:
noiseless measurements) Consider the general detection problem (4.2). Let Cd and P
be as in Definition 33, and assume that the measurements from both these node sets are
noiseless (σ2v = 0). Associated with these measurements, let Pe (Cd) and Pe (P) be the
respective error probabilities that are computed using (4.6). Then, Pe (Cd) ≤ Pe (P).
This above theorem is a consequence of the following result in the binary detection
problem, known as theorem of irrelevance [87] and the invariance of MAP rule [52].
Lemma 36 (Error probability of the MAP detector: dependent measurements)
Let M1 and M2 be any two arbitrary simple hypotheses with non-zero priors. Let δ1 be the
error probability of a MAP detector relying on the measurement Y ∈ Rp1, and δ2 be such a
quantity associated with the measurement Z = g(Y) + v, where g(.) : Rp1 → Rp2 and v is
stochastically independent of the hypotheses. Then, δ1 ≤ δ2.
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From Lemma 36, it also follows that Theorem 35 holds true even (i) for the case
of non-Gaussian input and measurements (provided that the joint density exists), and (ii)
if the set P is replaced with P ∪C˜d, where C˜d ⊆ Cd. Theorem 35 implies that, in the absence
of noise, nodes near the input location achieve better detection performance compared to
those far away from the inputs, irrespective of the edge weights in the adjacency matrix G
and the measurement horizon N . Here, the notion of closeness is to be understood in the
sense of node cutsets, since, d ≤ dist(K, Cd) < dist(K,P). Thus, if node cutsets exist in a
graph and the measurements are noiseless, one should always place sensors on the cutsets.
Thus, if a budget is associated with the sensor placement, it makes sense to find a cutset
Cd of minimum cardinality.
Proposition 37 (Error probability of the oracle detector) Consider the general de-
tection problem (4.2), and let δ1 be the error probability of a MAP detector which can directly
access the inputs w[k], k = 0, . . . , N . For any sensor set J , let δ2 and δ3 be the error prob-
abilities associated with the noiseless (σ2v = 0) and noisy (σ
2
v > 0) measurements YJ (4.4),
respectively. Then, δ1 ≤ δ2 ≤ δ3.
Proposition 37 states that sensor noise degrades the performance of the MAP
detector (this fact is also illustrated in Example 22). It also implies that measuring the
inputs directly is always better than measuring the noisy/noiseless states (dynamics) of the
nodes. Of course, given this fact, it is always beneficial to place the sensors at the input
nodes, rather than dealing with the node cutsets and the partitioned sets.
We now consider the case of noisy measurements (σ2v > 0). Notice that our
results will be specific to the MAP and LD-MAP detectors associated with the mean and
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covariance shift models, respectively. Possible extensions to the general detection problem
(4.2) are briefly mentioned in the remarks. We now introduce some additional notation.
For a cutset Cd, let xc[k], xs[k], and xp[k] denote the states of the node sets Cd, S, and P,
respectively. Let M be a permutation matrix such that x[k] = M [xs[k]
T,xc[k]
T,xp[k]
T]T,
where x[k] is the state vector of (4.1). Then, from (4.1) it also follows that
xs[k + 1]
xc[k + 1]
xp[k + 1]
=

Gss Gsc 0
Gcs Gcc Gcp
0 Gpc Gpp

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−1GM

xs[k]
xc[k]
xp[k]
+

ws[k]
0
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M−1Πw[k]
. (4.17)
From the above relation, note that the states of Cd serve as an input for the states of
partitioned nodes set P, i.e.,
xp[k + 1] = Gppxp[k] +Gpcxc[k]. (4.18)
Based on the transfer function matrix of subsystem (4.18), we now state a result
that is analogous to Theorem 35, for the case σ2v > 0.
Theorem 38 (Performance of sensors on the node cutset vs the partitioned set:
noisy measurements) Let Gpp and Gpc be as in (4.17), and assume that spec(Gpp)∩{z ∈
C : |z| = 1} = φ. Let ρ(z) and ρ(z) be the maximum and minimum singular values of
Ts(z) = (zI − Gpp)−1Gpc, respectively. Let Pem(Cd) in (4.11) and Pev(Cd) in (4.12) be
the error probabilities obtained using the noisy measurements (σ2v > 0) from the cutset Cd.
Instead, let Pem(P) and Pev(P) be the error probabilities associated with the partitioned set
P. Then we have:
1a) If ρ(1) ≤ 1, then Pem(Cd)≤Pem(P).
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1b) If ρ(1) > 1, then Pem(Cd)>Pem(P).
2a) If sup|z|=1 ρ(z) ≤ 1 then Pev(Cd)≤Pev(P).
2b) If inf |z|=1 ρ(z) > 1, then Pev(Cd)>Pev(P).
Hence, in the presence of noise, depending upon the entries in the matrix [GppGpc],
measuring the cutset Cd might not be always optimal for the purposes of the detection.
Instead, in the noiseless case, Theorem 35 states that measuring the cutset is always optimal,
irrespective of the entries inG. We now explain the reason behind this contrasting behaviors.
Notice that, the quantities sup and inf of ρ(z) and ρ(z) in Theorem 38, respectively,
are the maximum and minimum input to output gains of the transfer function matrix Ts(z),
associated with the system (4.18). Theorem 38 says that, if the gain between the states xc[k]
and the states xp[k] is high (low), the detection performance with sensors in P should be
better (worse) that that of Cd. In fact, recall from Lemma 29 that the detectors associated
with the noisy measurements of Cd and P, respectively, depends on the SNRs of xc[k] and
xc[k] (plus the sensor noise), respectively. Since xp[z] = Ts(z)xc[z], it is clear that the SNRs
are influenced by the gains of Ts(z). In particular, a higher gain increases the SNR of the
detector associated with P, which results in a better performance compared to the detector
associated with that of Cd.
The above reasoning also holds in the case of noiseless measurements, however,
the transfer function gain do not influence MAP detector’s performance. In fact, this gain
gets canceled in the error probability computations (this can be clearly seen in Example 22
by interpreting α as the gain). Theorem 38 provides conditions for placing sensors on or
away from the cutset nodes. For general adjacency matrix, one needs to rely on the software
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(based on LMI based inequalities) to validate those conditions. However, for non-negative
adjacency matrices, the conditions for placing (or not) sensors on the cutset nodes can be
stated based on algebraic conditions on the entries of the adjacency matrix. In fact, we
have the following result:
Lemma 39 (Non-negative adjacency matrix) Let the matrix G in (4.1) be non-negative,
and G˜ = [GppGpc] ∈ Rm1×n1, where Gpp and Gpc are defined in (4.18).
1. If ‖G˜‖∞≤1/√m1, then we have Pem(Cd)≤Pem(P) and Pev(Cd)≤Pev(P).
2. If n1 = 1, and all row sums of G˜ are greater than one, then Pem(Cd)≥ Pem(P˜) and
Pev(Cd)≥Pev(P˜), where P˜ ⊆ P.
The inequality Pem(Cd)≤Pem(P) can be obtained even without the non-negativity
assumption on G. However, this might not be true for the case of Pev(·). Thus, by ensuring
that the maximum row sum of G˜ is bounded by 1/
√
m1 (here m1 refers to the cardinality
of the partitioned set P), one can guarantee that the detection performance of sensors
on the cutset is always superior than that of the sensors on the partitioned nodes. The
assumption n1 = 1 in part 2) of above lemma implies that card(Cd) = 1. For arbitrary n1,
the condition row sums of G˜ greater than one may not be sufficient, and more assumptions
on G are required to handle this case. For instance, when G is a diagonally dominant matrix,
required sufficient conditions can be obtained using the lower bounds in [83]. Finally, we
notice that the bounds presented in Lemma 39 depends on the cardinality of the node sets,
and hence, our results on networks with non-negative edge weights may be conservative
when these cardinalities are large.
79
Remark 40 (Extension of network theoretic results to the other detectors: noisy
measurements) In the cases where the analytical error probability calculation is difficult,
eg., the general Gaussian or non-Gaussian detection problem and the covariance shift model
with arbitrary covariance matrix structures, one relies on the Chernoff type bounds (for eg.,
see [80]) to quantify the detection performance. In both the cases, i.e., evaluating the per-
formance directly or via bounds, Theorem 38 holds true for any detector whose performance
(resp. bounds) is monotonically increasing in ‖T (z) = C(zI −G)−1Π‖M , for some suitable
M  0. For instance, the Chernoff bounds on the error probability of the general Gaussian
detection problem (4.2) depend on the moment generating function (MGF) of the test statis-
tic of the MAP detector, which depends on the filtered mean and covariance matrices (4.8),
and our analysis becomes applicable. In the non-Gaussian case, the MGF might depend on
other moments as well, and extending our results to this case will be challenging. 
4.3.1 Single input single output (SISO) line networks
In this section, we validate our cutset based results, that we present in previous
section, for the case of line networks by explicitly expressing the error probabilities as a
function of the entires of G, and then compare the performance of sensors on Cd versus
sensors on P. We restrict our attention to the SISO systems.
We assume that a stochastic input enters the network through a fixed node q ∈
{1, . . . , n}, and we allow any node l ∈ {1, . . . , n} with dist(l, q) ≥ d for sensor placement.
For this setup, we assume that probabilities Pem(l) and Pev(l) are obtained by substituting
the SNRs ηs (4.15) and Rs (4.16) in the expressions of (4.11) and (4.12), respectively. Notice
that, in contrast to the previous analysis, in which we assume Σ2 = 0 (see Assumption 28),
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Figure 4.2: Toeplitz line network with n nodes. The q-th node is injected with the input,
and the j-th node represents the cutset node.
in this section we do not assume σ22 = 0 in Rs. For the ease of presentation, we assume
the cutset to be a singleton set, i.e., Cd = {j}. The following proposition is an extension of
Lemma 39 for our SISO system setup with the revised error probabilities.
Proposition 41 Let G˜ be as in Lemma 39, and σ2v > 0. Let {j} and P be the cutset and
partitioned sets, resp. If ‖G˜‖∞ ≤ 1, then for any j1 ∈ P, we have Pem(j)≤ Pem(j1) and
Pev(j)≤ Pev(j1). The opposite inequality holds true if all row sums of G˜ are greater than
one.
The proof of above proposition is similar to the proof of Lemma 39 and hence, the
details are omitted. By not resorting to any proof techniques, i.e, the functional dependence
arguments, that we used in previous section, we now validate assertions in above proposition
by expressing the error probability in terms of the entries in the matrix G. To this aim,
we consider a line network (see Fig. 4.2), whose adjacency matrix is given by the following
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matrix:
G =

a b 0 · · · 0 0
c a b · · · 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · a b
0 0 0 · · · c a

n×n
, (4.19)
where, a, b, c ∈ R≥0. We let the cutset node j be located on the right of the input node
q, i.e., 1 ≤ q < j < n (see Fig 4.2). The case when j is to the left side of the input node
q follows similar analysis. Thus, we have the partitioned set P = {j + 1, . . . , n}. We now
show that, for any l ∈ P, the error probabilities Pem(l) and Pev(l) are greater or smaller
than those of the cutset node j. The following proposition helps us achieve the required
goal:
Proposition 42 Let G be as in (4.19) and λ(G) < 1. Let |(I −G)−1l,q | be the absolute value
of (l, q)-th entry of (I −G)−1. Let G˜ be as in Lemma 39. Then, we have:
i) If ‖G˜‖∞ < 1, then |(I −G)−1q,q | ≥ |(I −G)−1q+1,q| · · · ≥ |(I −G)−1n,q|.
ii) If all row sums of G˜ are greater than one, then |(I − G)−1lq | ≥ |(I − G)−1qq | for all
q < l ≤ n. If b = 0, we have |(I −G)−1q+1,q| ≥ |(I −G)−1q+2,q| · · · ≥ |(I −G)−1n,q|.
For a fixed input q, above proposition characterizes the qualitative behavior of the
input-to-output transfer function gains associated with different output nodes. This fact
can be easily seen by expressing |(I − G)−1lq | as |eTl (I − G)−1eq|. For the case of Toeplitz
line networks, the assertion in Proposition 41 is now an easy consequence of Proposition 31
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Figure 4.3: The graph of a network consisting of 10 nodes. The nodes that are to the right
of the cutset node {3} form the partitioned set. Instead, nodes 1 and 2 form the source set.
and 42. In particular, if b = 0 and a+c > 1, Proposition 42 also implies that, the node that
is farthest from the input has better detection performance than any other node, including
the cutset node. Similarly, assertion in Theorem 35 can be verified by letting σ2v = 0.
The procedure illustrated above, evaluating the error probabilities via the entries
of (I −G)−1, becomes tedious and might not be even possible for arbitrary network struc-
tures. In such situations, one can use the proof techniques presented in Section 4.3 for
understanding the detection performance of sensors on networks.
4.4 Simulation results
In this section, we present numerical simulations to validate the effectiveness of
our cutset based characterization of MAP detection performance on networks.
(A. Detection performance of sensors on the partitioned nodes is better than that
of the sensors on the cutset nodes): For this scenario, consider the network in Fig 4.3. The
network has 10 nodes, with 1 and 2 being the input nodes, Cd = {3} is the cutset node,
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Figure 4.4: Actual and asymptotic error probabilities (Lemma 29) of the MAP and LD-
MAP detectors associated with various nodes of the network shown in Fig. 4.3. The panels
(a) and (b) corresponds to the adjacency matrix that results in the shorter memory of
the network dynamics (3.2). Instead, panels (c) and (d) are associated with an adjacency
matrix that results in the longer memory of the network dynamics. The error probability
associated with each node in the partitioned set P = {4, . . . , 10} is less than that of the
cutset node Cd = {3}. This result is consistent with Lemma 39, because all row sums of
submatrix G˜ are greater than one.
and P = {4, . . . , 10} is the partitioned node set. The adjacency matrix of this network is
nilpotent, and as a result, system (4.1) evolving on this network will have a short memory
(in fact G10 = 0). By short (resp. long) memory, we mean that the current state of the
network depends on few (resp. several) past states. For the mean shift model, the input
wi[k] ∼ N (µi1, σ2i I2×2), where µ1 = 2, µ2 = 1, and σ22 = σ22 = 1.5. Instead, for the
covariance shift model, the input2 wi[k] ∼ N (0, σ2i I2×2), where σ21 = 2.0 and σ22 = 1.0. In
both the models, N = 200 and the sensor noise variance σ2v = 1.2.
2the choice of zero mean is arbitrary, since, the LD-MAP detector’s error probability do not depend on
the mean; see Lemma 29.
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Fig. 4.4(a) and Fig. 4.4(b) illustrates the actual and asymptotic error probabilities
of the mean and covariance shift models, respectively. The error probabilities are computed
using the formulas in Lemma 29. In particular, for the asymptotic case, we use the SNRs
in Corollary 30. In both figures, the error probability associated with the cutset node is
greater than that of any node in the partitioned set. This must be the case since G ≥ 0,
and the row sums of the submatrix G˜ are greater than one (see Lemma 39).
The error between the asymptotic and actual error probabilities in Fig. 4.4(a) and
Fig. 4.4(b) is almost negligible, even when N is not large. This is because the adjacency
matrix G is a nilpotent matrix, and as a result, the difference between the actual and
asymptotic SNRs is minimum. However, this might not be the case when G has long
memory, i.e., Gk ≈ 0 only for a very large k. For N = 800, Fig. 4.4(c) and Fig. 4.4(d)
illustrate this scenario for the network that is obtained by modifying some edges of the
network in Fig. 4.3, such that Gk ≈ 0 for very large k.
(B. Detection performance of sensors on the cutset nodes is better than that of the
sensors on the partitioned nodes): Consider the network shown in Fig 4.5. The network
has 50 nodes among which K = {1, 2, 3, 5, 21, 26, 36, 43} are the input nodes. The cutset
Cd = {22, 30, 38} separatesK from the partitioned set P = {34, 35, 40, 42, 44, 48, 49}. For the
mean shift model, the input wi[k] ∼ N (µi1, σ2i I8), where µ1 = 2, µ2 = 1, and σ22 = σ22 = 1.5,
and σ2v = 1.2. Instead, for the covariance shift model, the input wi[k] ∼ N (0, σ2i I8), where
σ21 = 25.0, σ
2
2 = 0.1, and σ
2
v = 0.5. In both the models, N = 200.
Consider all possible subsets of Cd unionsqP whose cardinalities are same as that of the
cutset Cd. It is easy to see that there are 120 such sets. For each of these sets, we associate
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Figure 4.5: Graph associated with a randomly generated network consisting of 50 nodes
[64]. A total of 8 nodes are subjected to stochastic inputs. Instead, sensors are placed on
the cutset nodes and the partitioned nodes that are not collocated with the input nodes.
a label Jind, where ind ∈ {1, . . . , 120}. The labels are given based on a decreasing order
of the error probabilities associated with the subsets. In Fig. 4.6(a) and Fig. 4.6(b), we
show the actual and asymptotic error probabilities of the mean and covariance shift models,
respectively. In both figures, the error probability associated with the Cd is lesser than that
of any Jind. This must be the case because G ≥ 0, and the row sums of the submatrix
‖G˜‖∞ < 1/
√
7 = 0.3780 (see Lemma 39).
4.5 Summary
In this paper we formulate a sensor placement problem for linear dynamical sys-
tems defined over networks with unknown stochastic inputs, using the statistical hypothesis
testing framework. In particular, the main technical contribution of this paper is to derive
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Figure 4.6: Actual and asymptotic error probabilities (Lemma 29) of the MAP and LD-
MAP detectors associated with the node cutset Cd and all possible 3 node subsets of Cd unionsqP
of the network shown in Fig. 4.5.The error probabilities of the detectors associated with
cutset nodes is lower than that of the detectors associated with any subset of the nodes in
the partitioned set. This result is consistent with Lemma 39, because the submatrix G˜ row
sums of the adjacency matrix G are less than 1/
√
m1 (m1 = 7).
sufficient conditions under which a MAP detector associated with the sensors closer to the
input nodes results in better (or worse) performance than compared to a MAP detector
associated with the sensors that are far away from the input nodes. For networks with
non-negative adjacency matrix, we show that the sensors should be placed either near the
origin of the signal or, as far as possible from it, depending on the network parameters.
4.2 Appendix
Proof of proposition 26: From the network dynamics (4.1) and sensor measurements (4.3),
YJ (4.4) can be expanded as
YJ = Ox[0] + Fw0:N−1 + v1:N , (4.20)
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where w0:N−1 = [w[0]T, . . . ,w[N − 1]T]T and v1:N = [v[1]T, . . . ,v[N ]T]T, respectively. The
matrices O and F are defined in the statement of the proposition. The expressions of µi
and Σi in (4.8) follows by taking the expectation and covariance of YJ . 
Proof of Lemma 27: Let ζ and z are the realizations of YJ and y, respectively. Since
the input and measurement noises follows a Gaussian distribution, the probability density
functions of YJ (4.4) and y = bTYJ are
f(ζ|Hi) ∝ 1√
|Σi|
exp
[
−1
2
(ζ − µi)TΣ−1i (ζ − µi)
]
and
g(z|Hi) ∝ 1√
bTΣib
exp
[
−(z − b
Tµi)
2
2 bTΣib
]
, (4.21)
respectively, where | · | denotes the determinant. Define the log likelihood ratios Ψ(ζ) =
ln(f(ζ|H2)/f(ζ|H1)) and Ψ̂(z) = ln(f(z|H2)/f(z|H1)). Then, from the mixed Bayes for-
mula [52], the MAP decision rules based on ζ and z, respectively, are given by
Ψ(ζ)
Ĥ=H2
≷
Ĥ=H1
γ and Ψ̂(z)
Ĥ=H2
≷
Ĥ=H1
γ. (4.22)
part 1) Since Σ1 = Σ2 and µ1 6= µ2, from (4.8), it follows that Σ1 = Σ2 and
µ1 6= µ2. Invoking this observation in f(ζ|Hi), yields the following expression for ψ(ζ):
Ψ(ζ) = −0.5µT∆Σ−12 µ∆ + (y − µ1)T Σ−12 µ∆. (4.23)
Substitute (4.23) in the first decision rule of (4.22) and simplify the expression to obtain the
MAP decision rule (4.9) for ζ. Finally, replacing ζ with YJ yields the required expression.
part 2) In this case we have µ1 = µ2 and Σ1 6= Σ2. A similar procedure, as in
part 1), based on g(z|Hi) (4.22) and the second decision rule in (4.21), yields the LD-MAP
detector’s expression (4.9). Details are left to the reader. 
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Proof of Lemma 29: We divide the proof into two parts. In part 1) we derive the expressions
(4.11) and (4.13) Instead, in part 2) we derive the expressions (4.12) and (4.14).
part 1) Under the assumption that N < ∞, let P̂em(J ) be the error probability
of (4.9).. Then, from (4.9), we have
Pr
(
Ĥ = H2|H1
)
= Pr
(
s > µT∆Σ
−1
c (µ1 + µ2) |H1
)
and
Pr
(
Ĥ = H1|H2
)
= Pr
(
s < µT∆Σ
−1
c (µ1 + µ2) |H2
)
,
where s = 2µT∆Σ
−1
c YJ follows N (µT∆Σ
−1
c µ1, 4µ
T
∆Σ
−1
c µ∆) under Hi, because s is a linear
transform of YJ |Hi, which follows a Gaussian distribution. Define η̂2 = µT∆Σ
−1
c µ∆, and
notice that Pr(Ĥ = H2|H1) = QN (0.5 η̂) and Pr(Ĥ = H1|H2) = 1 − QN (0.5 η̂). Finally,
from (4.6), we have P̂em(J ) = 0.5QN (η̂). Define Pem(J ) = limN→∞ P̂em(J ), and note that
Pem(J ) = lim
N→∞
0.5QN (0.5 η̂) = 0.5QN
(
0.5 lim
N→∞
η̂
)
where the final equality follows because η̂ is increasing in N (see Proposition A.43). We
now show that limN→∞ η̂ = η. From (4.8), it follows that
η̂2 = (Fm)T Σ−1c (Fm) , (4.24)
where m = 1N ⊗ µ∆ and µ∆ = µ2 − µ1. Let l = 1, 2, . . . ., and define K(l) = CGlΠ
and S(i) =
∑i−1
l=0 K(l). With these definitions and the assumption λ(G) < 1, we have
limi→∞ S(i) = C(I −G)−1Π , K, and
Fm =
[
(S(1)−K)T (S(2)−K)T · · · (S(N)−K)T
]T
︸ ︷︷ ︸
SN
µ∆ +
[
1N ⊗K
]
µ∆. (4.25)
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Let t(SN )=µ
T
∆
[
STNΣ
−1
c SN + 2S
T
NΣ
−1
c
[
1N ⊗K
]]
µ∆. From (4.25) and (4.24), we have
η̂2 = µT∆
[
1N ⊗K
]T
Σ
−1
c
[
1N ⊗K
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
µ∆ + t(SN ). (4.26)
Since x[0] = 0, from (4.8), it follows that Σc=
[F (IN ⊗ Σc)FT+σ2vI]. Further,
[
1N ⊗K
]T
Σc =
[
K
T
KΣc + σ
2
vI
] [
1N ⊗K
]T
+
K
T
[
S˜TN (I ⊗ Σc)FT +KΣcSTN
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M˜
, (4.27)
where S˜N is obtained by permuting, bottom to top, the block matrices of SN (4.25). Right
multiplying either sides of (4.27) with Σc
−1 [
1N ⊗K
]
gives us:
NK
T
K=
[
K
T
KΣc + σ
2
vI
]
F + P, (4.28)
where P = M˜Σc
−1
[1N ⊗K] and F is defined in (4.26). Since KTKΣc  0, from (4.28), it
follows that F = [K
T
KΣc + σ
2
vI]
−1[NKTK − P ]. Substituting F in (4.26) yields
η̂2 = NµT∆([K
T
KΣc + σ
2
vI]
−1KTK)µ∆ + (N),
where (N) = −µT∆[K
T
KΣc + σ
2
vI]
−1Pµ∆ + t(SN ). Finally, substituting K = LΣ
− 1
2
c in the
above expression, and manipulating the terms will give us
η̂2 = N µ˜T∆
(
[LTL+ σ2vI]
−1LTL
)
µ˜∆ + (N). (4.29)
We claim that limN→∞ (N) = 0. To see this, rewrite (N) as µT∆(Q1(N) +
Q2(N) +Q3(N))µ∆, where
Q1(N) = S
T
N
[
Σ
−1
c SN + 2Σ
−1
c
[
1N ⊗K
]]
Q2(N) = [K
T
KΣc + σ
2
vI]
−1KTS˜TN (I ⊗ Σc)FT
Q3(N) = [K
T
KΣc + σ
2
vI]
−1KTKΣcSTN .
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From part 1) of Assumption 28, there exist a k ∈ N such that for all m ∈ {k, k+ 1, . . . , N},
S(m)−K = 0. Thus, all but finite rows of SN (4.25) are zeros, i.e., we can express STN as
[FT1 0
T] and S˜TN as [0
T FT2 ], where the dimension of F1 and F2 depends only k. Thus, for
all N > k, Qi(N) is a constant matrix, say Qi, and we may conclude that
‖µ∆‖22
3∑
i=1
λmin(Qi +Q
T
i ) ≤ 2
3∑
i=1
µT∆Qiµ∆ ≤ ‖µ∆‖22
3∑
i=1
λmax(Qi +Q
T
i ),
where λmax(·) and λmin(·) are the maximum and minimum eigenvalues. Since limN→∞N‖µ∆‖2 =
c (Assumption 28), it follows that limN→∞ ‖µ∆‖2 = 0. Hence, limN→∞ (N) = 0 and
limN→∞ η̂ = η (4.13).
part 2) Under the assumption that N < ∞, let P̂ev(J ) be the error probability
of (4.10). Then, from (4.9), we have
Pr
(
Ĥ = H2|H1
)
=Pr
(
ln(R̂)>
[
Z2
bTΣ2b
− Z
2
bTΣ1b
]
|H1
)
,
Pr
(
Ĥ = H1|H2
)
=Pr
(
ln(R̂)<
[
Z2
bTΣ2b
− Z
2
bTΣ1b
]
|H2
)
,
where Z = bT[YJ−µc] and R̂ = (bTΣ1b/(bTΣ2b) > 1 (since Σ2 = 0; Assumption 28). Let
U ∼ N (0, 1). Then, Z|Hi d= (
√
bTΣib)U , where
d
= means equality in the distribution. From
this fact, we now have Pr(Ĥ = H2|H1) = Pr
(
τ̂ > U2
)
and Pr(Ĥ = H1|H2) = Pr(U2 > τ̂R̂),
where τ̂ = ln(R̂)/(R̂− 1). Since U2 ∼ χ2(1), we finally have
P̂ev(J )=0.5
[
1−Qχ2 (1, τ̂)
]
+ 0.5Qχ2(1, τ̂ R̂).
To simplify R̂, note the following: since b is the maximizer of I-divergence (4.7), from [70],
we can also express R̂ as
R̂ =
bTΣ1b
bTΣ2b
= max
d∈RmN
dTΣ1d
dTΣ2d
.
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Let c = Σ
1/2
2 d, and note the following:
R̂ = max
c∈RmN
(
c
‖c‖2
)T
Σ
−1/2
2 Σ1Σ
−1/2
2
(
c
‖c‖2
)
= λmax
(
Σ
−1/2
2 Σ1Σ
−1/2
2
)
= λmax
(
Σ1Σ
−1
2
)
.
Since R̂ is an increasing sequence, with respect to N (see Proposition A.43), the limits
R = limN→∞ R̂, τ = limN→∞ τ̂ and limN→∞ τ̂ R̂ = τR are well defined. Now, consider
Pev(J ) = lim
N→∞
P̂ev(J )
= lim
N→∞
0.5
[
1−Qχ2 (1, τ̂)
]
+ 0.5Qχ2(1, τ̂ R̂)
= 0.5
[
1−Qχ2 (1, τ)
]
+0.5Qχ2(1, τR),
where the last equality follows because τ̂ and τ̂ R̂ are decreasing and increasing in N (Propo-
sition A.43), respectively. We now show that R is given by (4.14). Since Σ2 = 0 and
x[0] = 0, we have Σ2 = σ
2
vI and Σ1 = FF
T + σ2vI, where F = F(IN ⊗Σ
1
2
1 ) and Σ
1
2
1 satisfies
Σ1 = Σ
1
2
1 Σ
1
2
1 . From these observations, we may conclude that
R = lim
N→∞
R̂ = lim
N→∞
λmax(FF
T + σ2vI)
σ2v
= 1 + σ−2v lim
N→∞
λmax(FF
T). (4.30)
It now suffices to evaluate limN→∞ λmax(FFT. Since λ(G) < 1, we may define the following
matrix valued function [31]:
A(ω) =
∞∑
l=0
K(l)Σ
1/2
1 e
jkω ω ∈ [0, 2pi],
where K(l) = CGlΠ and j =
√−1. Since the coefficients K(l)Σ1/21 are absolutely summable,
for any l ∈ N, these coefficients can also be recovered as [31]:
K(l)Σ
1/2
1 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
A(ω)e−jlωdω.
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Let z be the conjugate of z ∈ C. Then, from [7, Chapter 6.4], we have
lim
N→∞
λ1/2max(FF
T)=ess sup
ω∈[0,2pi]
‖A(ω)‖2
=ess sup
ω∈[0,2pi]
∥∥∥∥∥C
( ∞∑
l=0
Glejlω
)
ΠΣ
1/2
1
∥∥∥∥∥
2
=ess sup
ω∈[0,2pi]
∥∥∥C (I −Gejw)−1 ΠΣ1/21 ∥∥∥
2
= ess sup
{z∈C:|z|=1}
∥∥∥C (zI −G)−1 ΠΣ1/21 ∥∥∥
2
(a)
= ess sup
{z∈C:|z|=1}
∥∥∥C (zI −G)−1 ΠΣ1/21 ∥∥∥
2
= ess sup
{z∈C:|z|=1}
∥∥∥∥T (z)Σ 121 ∥∥∥∥
2
= ||T (z)Σ
1
2
1 ||∞.
where (a) follows because, for any A ∈ CN×N with A∗ denoting its complex conjugate
transpose, ‖A‖2 = ‖AT‖2 = ‖A∗‖2. Substituting limN→∞ λ1/2max(FFT) in (4.30) gives us
R = 1 + σ−2v ||T ∗(z)||2∞. 
Proof of Theorem 35: Let yP [k] and yS [k] denote the measurements of associated with the
sensor sets P and C, respectively. Since σ2v = 0, from (4.18), we have
yP [k + 1] = GppyP [k] +ByC [k], (4.31)
where B = Gpc. From (4.31), it follows that
yP [1]
yP [2]
...
yP [N ]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
YP
=

Gpp B
G2pp GppB
...
...
GNpp G
N−1
pp B

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
yP [0]
yC [0]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ŷ[0]
+

0 0 · · · 0 0
B 0 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
GN−2pp B GN−3pp B · · · B 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
M̂

yC [1]
yC [2]
...
yC [N ]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
YC
.
93
Since Ŷ[0] is independent of Hi, the assertion of the theorem follows from Lemma 36. .
Proof of Lemma 36 We shall prove the result assuming that Y and Z = g(Y) + v admits
density functions. With the expense of notation, the given proof can be adapted to handle
random variables that do not have densities. Let L = [YT,ZT]T. Consider the following
log likelihood ratio (LR) based on L:
f(l|M2)
f(l|M1) =
f(y, g(y) + v|M2)
f(y, g(y) + v|M1)
=
f(y, g(y) + v|y,M2)f(y|M2)
f(y, g(y) + v|y,M1)f(y|M1)
(a)
=
f(y, g(y) + v|y)f(y|M2)
f(y, g(y) + v|y)f(y|M1) =
f(y|M2)
f(y|M1) ,
where (a) follows because v is independent of Mi. Since LRs of L and Y are equal, the error
probabilities associated with their MAP rules should be the same. Instead, error probability
of the MAP rule based on L is always superior to that of Y or Z alone. Thus δ1 ≤ δ2. 
Proof of Theorem 38: Consider the following deterministic analogue of (4.1): x[k + 1] =
Gx[k] + Πu, where u is arbitrary. Recall that xp[k+ 1] = Gppxp[k] +Gpcxc[k] (4.18). Since
x[0] = 0, for z /∈ spec(G) ∪ spec(Gpp), we have
x[z] = (zI −G)−1Πu and (4.32a)
xp[z] = (zI −Gpp)−1Gpcxc[z] = Ts(z)xc[z]. (4.32b)
From (4.32b), the following inequalities are obvious
ρ(z)‖xc[z]‖2 ≤ ‖xp[z]‖2 ≤ ρ(z)‖xc[z]‖2. (4.33)
Let C1 and C2 be the sensor matrices associated with C and P, respectively. Then,
xc[z] = C1x[z] and xp[z] = C1x[z]. (4.34)
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part 1) We now consider the cases 1a) and 1b). Let Li = Ci(I−G)−1ΠΣ
1
2
c , where
Σc = Σ
1
2
c Σ
1
2
c is defined in Lemma 27. Let z = 1. Then, from (4.34) note that
‖xc[1]‖22 = ‖C1x[1]‖22 = uTLT1L1u and
‖xp[1]‖22 = ‖C2x[1]‖22 = uTLT2L2u.
From (4.33) and above identities, it follows that
ρ(1) < 1 =⇒ LT1L1 + σ2vI  LT2L2 + σ2vI and
ρ(1) > 1 =⇒ LT2L2 + σ2vI  LT1L1 + σ2vI.
(4.35)
Let u = µ˜∆, where µ˜∆ is defined in the statement of Lemma 29. Let η1 and η2 be the
SNRs of Pem(C) and Pem(P), respectively. Then from (4.13), we have
η2i = N µ˜
T
∆
(
[LTi Li + σ
2
vI]
−1LTi Li
)
µ˜∆.
Using the identity [LTi Li + σ
2
vI]
−1LTi Li = I − σ2v [LTi Li + σ2vI]−1, we can also express η2i as
η2i = µ˜
T
∆µ˜∆ − σ2v µ˜T∆
[
LTi Li + σ
2I
]−1
µ˜T∆. (4.36)
Finally, from (4.36) and (4.35), and Proposition 31, we have
ρ(1) < 1 =⇒ η21 ≥ η22 =⇒ Pem(Cd)≤Pem(P) and
ρ(1) > 1 =⇒ η21 ≤ η22 =⇒ Pem(Cd)≥Pem(P).
part 2) We now consider the cases 2a) and 2b). Let Ti(z) = Ci(zI − G)−1. Let
u = Σ
1/2
1 d, where Σ
1/2
1 is defined in the statement of Lemma 29. From (4.34) and (4.32a),
we have xc[k] = T1(z)Σ
1/2
1 d and xc[k] = T2(z)Σ
1/2
1 d. By invoking these two facts in (4.33),
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we may now conclude that
sup
|z|=1
ρ(z) < 1 =⇒ ‖T2(z)Σ
1
2
1 d‖2 ≤ ‖T1(z)Σ
1
2
1 d‖2 and
inf
|z|=1
ρ(z) > 1 =⇒ ‖T2(z)Σ
1
2
1 d‖2 ≥ ‖T1(z)Σ
1
2
1 d‖2,
for all z that satisfies |z| = 1. Let R1 and R2 be the SNRs of Pev(C) and Pev(P), respectively.
Then, from (4.14)
Ri − 1 = ‖Ti(z)Σ
1
2
1 ‖2∞
σ2v
=
(
ess sup
{z∈C:|z|=1}
‖T2(z)Σ1/21 d‖2
)2
.
From Proposition 31, it follows that
sup
|z|=1
ρ(z) < 1 =⇒ R1 ≥ R2 =⇒ Pev(Cd)≤Pev(P) and
inf
|z|=1
ρ(z) > 1 =⇒ R1 ≤ R2 =⇒ Pev(Cd)≥Pev(P). 
Proof of Corollary 39: We shall prove part 1) of the corollary, and part 2) can be derived
using similar analysis (the details are omitted). The idea of the proof is to show that
||G˜||∞ ≤ 1/
√
m =⇒ ρ(1) < 1, and thereby invoking Theorem 38 yields the result.
step 1) For G ≥ 0, it follows that sup|z|=1 ρ(z) = ρ(1), where ρ(z) is ‖(zI −
Gpp)
−1Gpc‖2. To see this, note the following: For any d ∈ Cn1 , let |d| = (|d1|, . . . , |dn1 |)T.
Then, for any l ∈ N and z that satisfies |z| = 1, we have
|(zGpp)lGpcd| = |(Gpp)lGpcd| ≤ (Gpp)lGpc|d|,
where the inequality, to be understood coordinate wise, follows because [GppGpc] ≥ 0. From
the above inequality, and the fact |y + z| ≤ |y|+ |z| for any x,y ∈ Cp, we have∣∣∣∣∣
∞∑
l=0
(zGpp)
lGpcd
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∞∑
l=0
|(zGpp)lGpcd| ≤
∞∑
l=0
(Gpp)
lGpc|d|.
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Since Gpp is a submatrix of G ≥, which is a non-negative matrix, we have |λmax(zGpp)| =
|λmax(Gpp)| ≤ |λmax(G)| < 1 [5], the above inequality can also be expressed as
∣∣(I − zGpp)−1Gpcd∣∣ ≤ (I −Gpp)−1Gpc |d| .
Taking 2-norm on both sides of the inequality yields us:
∥∥ ∣∣(I − zGpp)−1Gpcd∣∣ ∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥ (I −Gpp)−1Gpc |d| ∥∥2 .
Since the above inequality holds for any vector d ∈ Rn1 , using the identity ‖ |x| ‖2 = ‖x ‖2
for any x ∈ Cp, the following inequality is now obvious:
sup
|z|=1
sup
‖d‖2=1
‖(I − zGpp)−1Gpcd‖2 ≤
∥∥ (I −Gpp)−1Gpc ∥∥2 ,
which can be expressed as sup|z|=1 ρ(z) ≤ ρ(1). The equality is attained at z = 1.
step 2) Since sup|z|=1 ρ(z) = ρ(1), from Theorem 38 it readily follows that, both
Pem(Cd)≤Pem(P) and Pev(Cd)≤Pev(P) holds true whenever ρ(1) < 1. We now show that
‖G˜‖∞ = ‖[GppGpc]‖∞ < 1/√m1 guarantees ρ(1) < 1. Let 1 denote the all ones vector, and
note the following identity:Gpp Gpc
0 I

k 1
1
 =
Gkpp
∑k−1
l=0 G
l
ppGpc
0 I

k 1
1
 . (4.37)
Since ‖[Gpp Gpc]‖∞ < 1/√m1, for any k ∈ N, we also haveGpp Gpc
0 I

k 1
1
 ≤
 1√m11
1
 .
From the above inequality and (4.37), it follows that
lim
k→∞
Gkpp
∑k−1
l=0 G
l
ppGpc
0 I

k 1
1
 ≤
 1√m11
1
 .
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Since |λmax(Gpp)| < 1, as k → ∞, we have Gkpp → 0 and
∑k−1
l=0 G
l
ppGpc → (I −Gpp)−1Gpc.
Thus (I−Gpp)−1Gpc1 = ‖(I−Gpp)−1Gpc‖∞ < 1/√m1, and hence, ρ(1) = ||(I−Gpp)−1Gpc||2 <
√
m1||(I −Gpp)−1Gpc||∞ < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 31: SinceQN (x) is decreasing function of x, Pem(J ) (4.11) is decreasing
in SNR η, given by either (4.13) or (4.15). For Pev(J ) (4.12) note the following: first, observe
that R > 1 in both (4.14) and (4.16). Thus
dτ
dR
=
(
R−1
R
)− lnR
(R− 1)2 < 0, and
d(τR)
dR
=
(R− 1)− lnR
(R− 1)2 > 0.
(4.38)
Hence, we conclude that τ is deceasing in R. Instead, τR is increasing in R. From this
observation and the fact that the Qχ2(1, z) = Pr[Z ≥ z], where Z ∼ χ2(1), is decreasing in
z, it follows that Pev(J ) is decreasing in R. 
Proof of Proposition 42: From (4.19), and the fact that 1 ≤ q < j < . . . < n, where Cd = {j}
and P = {j + 1, . . . , n}, the row sums of G˜ takes values in the set {a + c, a + b + c}. Let
|Gl,q| = |(I − G)−1l,q |. Using the principle of backward induction, we shall show that, when
‖G˜‖∞ = a+ b+ c < 1, {|Glq|}nl=q is monotonically decreasing. The proof of part (ii) is left
to the reader as an exercise. Let a˜ = 1− a, b˜ = −b, c˜ = −c. If a˜ 6= 0, then Gl,q of (I −G)−1
are given by the following expressions [43]:
Gl,q =
1
θn

(−1)l+q b˜q−lθl−1φq+1 q ≥ l
(−1)l+q c˜l−qθq−1φl+1 q < l
(4.39)
where l, q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and θk and φk are governed by
θk = a˜θk−1 − b˜c˜θk−2 for k = 2, . . . , n
φk = a˜φk+1 − b˜c˜φk+2 for k = n− 1, . . . , 1
(4.40)
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where θ0 = 1, θ1 = a˜, φn = a˜, φn+1 = 1 and θn = det(I−G). Let L = {q+1, . . . , n}. Then,
for any l ∈ L ∪ {q},
|Glq| , |(I −G)−1lq | =
∣∣∣∣θq−1c˜−qθn
∣∣∣∣ ∣∣∣c˜lφl+1∣∣∣ ,
Let l ∈ L, and define ζ(l) = |Gl,q|/|Gl−1,q|. Since φn+1 = 1 and φn = a˜, for l = n (base
step), it follows that
ζ(n) =
|Gnq|
|Gn−1,q|
=
|c˜nφn+1|
|c˜n−1φn| =
|c˜|
|a˜| =
c
1− a
(i)
< 1,
where (i) follows because a, b, c > 0, and a + b + c < 1. Let q < l < n and ζ(l + 1) < 1
(inductive step). Then,
ζ(l) =
|Gl,q|
|Gl−1,q|
=
|c˜| |φl+1|
|φl|
(4.40)
=
c∣∣∣a˜− b˜c˜(φl+2φl+1)∣∣∣ < 1,
To see the last inequality, consider the following:
b+ c < 1− a (ii)=⇒ b
( |c˜||φl+2|
|φl+1|
)
+ c < 1− a
=⇒ b
(
cφl+2
φl+1
)
+ c < 1− a
=⇒ c∣∣∣(1− a)− bc(φk+2φk+1)∣∣∣ < 1
(iii)
=⇒ |c˜|∣∣∣a˜− b˜c˜(φl+2φl+1)∣∣∣ < 1,
where (ii) follows because the hypothesis ζ(l + 1) < 1 implies that |c˜|(|φl+2|/|φl+1|) < 1,
and (iii) from the fact that a˜ = 1 − a, b˜ = −b, and c˜ = −c. From the principle of finite
induction, for all l ∈ L, we have ζ(l) < 1. Hence, {|Glq|}nl=q is a decreasing sequence. 
Proposition A.43 Let η̂2 = µT∆Σ
−1
c µ∆, R̂ = λmax(Σ1Σ
−1
2 ) and τ̂ = ln(R̂)/(R̂− 1), where
(µ∆, Σc, Σ1, Σ2) are defined in the statement of Lemma 27. Then, η̂, R̂, and τ are
increasing in N . However, τ̂ R̂ is decreasing in N .
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Proof. Let N < ∞. Then, from Proposition 26, we have µ∆ = E [YJ |H2] − E [YJ |H1],
Σc = Cov[YJ |H1] = Cov[YJ |H2]. For clarity, we drop the existing subscripts and replace
them with the total number of measurements. Let N2 = N1 + k, k ∈ N, and consider
YTN2 =
[
YTN1 , Z
T
k
]
, where Zk are the measurements collected after N1. Then,
µN2 =
 µN1
mk
 and ΣN2 =
 ΣN1 D
DT M
 ,
where mk = E[Zk|H2]−E[Zk|H1], M = Cov[Zk|H1] > 0, and D=Cov[Yk,Zk|H1]. Further,
using the Schur complement, Σ
−1
N2 can be expressed as
Σ
−1
N2 =
 ΣN1 D
DT M

−1
=
 Σ
−1
N1 0
0T 0
+ F︸︷︷︸
>0
.
From the above identity, it follows that
η̂N2 =
(
µTN2Σ
−1
N2µN2
) 1
2
=
(
µTN1Σ
−1
N1µN1 + µ
T
N2FµN2
) 1
2
≥
(
µTN1Σ
−1
N1µN1
)
= η̂N1 .
Hence, we may conclude that η̂ is increasing in N . Instead, from the eigenvalue interlacing
property for the symmetric matrix pencils [44], it follows that R̂ = λmax(Σ1Σ
−1
2 ) is increas-
ing in N . Finally, from (4.38), it follows that τ̂ and τ̂ R̂ are decreasing and increasing in N ,
respectively.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation is concerned with security of dynamical systems with emphasis
on interconnected and networked type dynamical systems. For interconnected systems, in
chapter 2, we highlighted the trade-offs between the performance of centralized and decen-
tralized detectors, and showed that a decentralized detector can outperform its centralized
counterpart, despite having less information about the system dynamics, and this property
is due to the nature of the considered attack detection problem. We illustrated our findings
on a real time power system model. Instead, in chapter 3, we developed a probabilistic
rule to randomly select a subsystem to attack, over time, and optimize over the switching
probabilities to maximize degradation and maintain undetectability from a centralized de-
tector. Overall, our results show that the ability to selectively compromise different parts
of a system over time greatly increases the severity of the attacks, thereby motivating the
development of advanced detection schemes for interconnected type dynamical systems.
For networked dynamical systems, in chapter 4, we studied a problem of detecting
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changes in the statistical properties of an input driving certain network nodes has to be
detected by sparse and remotely located sensors. We explicitly derive the Maximum A
Posteriori (MAP) detector, and characterize its performance as a function of the network
parameters, and the location of the sensor nodes. We show that, in the absence of measure-
ment noise, the detection performance obtained when sensors are located on a network cut is
not worse than the performance obtained by measuring all nodes of the subnetwork induced
by the cut and not containing the input node. Conversely, in the presence of measurement
noise, we show that the detection performance may increase or decrease with the graphical
distance between the input node and the sensors. Our analysis provided structural insights
into the optimal sensor placement problem. Opportunities for future work, with regards to
the current results in this thesis, includes the following:
• In chapter 1, we worked with a particular detection scheme and characterized perfor-
mance degradation due to undetectable detects. Several questions remain of interest
for future investigation, including the characterization of optimal detection schemes,
an analytical comparison of the degradation induced by undetectable attacks as a
function of the detection scheme, and the analysis of iterative detection strategies.
• In chapter 2, we were only able to demonstrate the superiority of probabilistic attacks
over a deterministic attack through numerical examples (the main difficulty being the
optimal probabilistic rule turned out to be a solution of non-convex optimization prob-
lem). As seen in the formulation of (P.2), one can see that, the optimal probabilistic
rule depends on the subsystem dynamics, interconnection signals, and the choice of
attack matrices. Understanding the role of these quantities on the optimal policy and
providing exact theoretical characterizations is also of interest.
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• In chapter 3, the analytical expressions of error probabilities are limited only to spe-
cial cases of general Gaussian detection problem. Further, we considered only time
invariant network models with deterministic edge weights. It would be interesting to
extend our network analysis to the time varying networks with random edge weights,
and also to the case where the input signal is non-Gaussian.
We end this section by commenting on the security aspects of dynamical systems
whose mathematical models are not necessarily given by the classical physics principles,
but are obtained using data-driven algorithms. For instance, Reinforcement or Statistical
learning based methods. As a result, these models will have completely different mathe-
matical as compared to thee existing parametric models. Hence, it is far from clear if the
characterizations provided in the thesis, or existing characterizations in the cyber-physical
security literature, extend naturally to these so called data-driven dynamical systems. As
a preliminary step towards this line of research, we are currently developing a theoretical
framework to understand the robustness of data driven closed loop systems using tools from
non-asymptotic random matrix theory. In particular, we are trying to come up with sharp
bounds on the probability of stability of a random closed loop LTI system, whose feedback
matrix is random. The hope is that using these bounds we can understand the role of system
theoretic properties on the behavior of the spectral radius of the closed loop system. The
stability of random matrices is still an open problem, and we firmly believe the following
spirit shared by authors in [9]: the one who adventures in the field of random matrix theory,
with emphasis on control applications, will encounter unexpected and exciting connections
among different fields of science and beautiful branches of mathematics.
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